

ONG BINH AN PHUOC PHU NHIEU BINH DINH AN  
VONG BINH DUC LAC SON BINH KY PHU QUY PH  
HIEU BINH HOANG BINH TUYEN BINH THIE  
RUNG SON SON CHAU SON LOC VINH LOC PH  
INH THACH AN SON HOA KHANH VAN AN TI  
ON TRUNG KHONG LOC DONH NHON KHAN  
AN SON HOA DIEN HONG DON BOBO SON KIM  
TRA MINH TRUNG HA TAY XUYEN CHAU PH  
NHU THANH PHONG BINH BACH HONG LOC  
ON XUYEN HIEP XUYEN TAY AN LAC XUYEN  
TRUONG CHIA SON KHIEU SON KHANH PHUOC  
HOI LOC XUYEN THAI DONG YEN XUYEN TAN  
TRIEU THAI KIM TAY TON THUAN SON XUY  
PHUOC XUYEN THO VAN QUAT NHON PHONG  
HANH CAT HUNG BINH AN HOA YEN DO  
THANH THUAN AN CHO MOI LAC CAU DIEN T  
SON KIM SON TRA LONG BINH AN PHUOC PH  
NHIEU BINH HOANG XUYEN TRUONG BINH SO

AMERICA'S  
RENTED  
TROOPS:  
SOUTH  
KOREANS IN  
VIETNAM

BY  
FRANK BALDWIN  
AND  
DIANE & MICHAEL  
JONES



AMERICA'S

RENTED

TROOPS :

SOUTH  
KOREANS IN  
VIETNAM

By  
Frank Baldwin  
and  
Diane and Michael Jones



**AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE**  
National Office: 160 N. 15th Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19102



Permission for reprinting granted on request. Please address inquiries to Information Services, American Friends Service Committee, 160 N. 15th St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19102



— CONTENTS —

I.	THE AMERICAN UTILIZATION OF SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM	1
	Frank Baldwin	
II.	ALLIES CALLED KOREANS — A REPORT FROM VIETNAM	17
	Diane and Michael Jones	

About the authors:

FRANK BALDWIN took his PhD at Columbia University and taught Korean history, language and politics there from 1968 to 1972. He is currently a free lance writer and translator in Tokyo.

DIANE & MICHAEL JONES are graduates of Reed College and served with the Peace Corps in Southeast Asia. They worked as Saigon Representatives for the American Friends Service Committee from 1970-72 and again in 1973-74.

Note on the cover:

The names surrounding the title are of the villages involved in the incidents with Korean troops described in the second article. Calligraphy by Michael Jones.



THE AMERICAN UTILIZATION OF SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM

By Frank Baldwin



## THE AMERICAN UTILIZATION OF SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM

by Frank Baldwin

South Korea's role in the Indochina War — providing an expeditionary force of over three hundred thousand combat troops and unremitting hawkish support for U. S. actions — illustrates two features of the war. The first was the benighted American attempt to internationalize the war as a cover for U. S. intervention. The second was the American utilization of Third Country Military Forces (TCMF), generally completely **and secretly** financed and equipped by the United States, to supplement U. S. ground forces.<sup>1</sup> Both aspects of U. S. strategy related to a principal objective of the Johnson and Nixon administrations in American domestic politics: to delay or prevent public perception of the real nature of the war and the acts of the U. S. government.

The employment of Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces in Vietnam was an important element of the U. S. intervention. The South Korean forces have been called mercenaries, not only by anti-war critics but even by the American officials who sponsored the South Korean role in the war.<sup>2</sup> While the R.O.K. expeditionary force was the result of diverse factors, including the security requirements and anti-communism of South Korea and American pressure, the appellation of mercenary cannot be avoided. However, what word or words suffice to describe the employers of mercenaries? If mercenaries are to be shunned and loathed as hired killers, how should we regard the men who hire the guns? This question should plague Americans because the R.O.K. expeditionary force and other TCMFs were recruited by the cream of the liberal Establishment from 1964 to 1968 and were retained in Vietnam for over four years more by the successor conservative elite.

The American and South Korean governments constantly concealed, censored, and lied about the U. S. utilization of R.O.K. forces in Vietnam. The Johnson administration deceived the Congress and the American people to put the South Korean troops there from 1965 to 1967. The Nixon administration covered up information on South Korean atrocities. The R.O.K. government told its people hardly anything about the role of its forces in Vietnam, not even the number of casualties they were suffering, until the statistics were revealed by the U. S. Congress in 1970. Through terror and propaganda the R.O.K. government kept its people ignorant of the atrocities committed by Korean forces and the opprobrium heaped on South Korea for its role in the war.

The U. S. began supporting foreign troops in Vietnam in 1950. By March 31, 1954, the U. S. had allocated \$785 million for "budgetary support" to help with the "pay, food, and allowances" for the French Expeditionary Force (FEF). Another \$440 million in military equipment had been provided.<sup>3</sup> Actually, the FEF had "relatively few Frenchmen" and was composed mainly of the Foreign Legion, Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians and Senegalese.<sup>4</sup> The U. S. also paid for Chinese Nationalist pilots to fly U. S. C-119s on combat missions in Vietnam<sup>5</sup> and sought to recruit Germans for Foreign Legion service in Indochina.<sup>6</sup>

U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tried to internationalize the war in April, 1954, by forming a coalition of the United States, England, France, the Associated States (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam), Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines to intervene in Vietnam.<sup>7</sup> This effort failed<sup>8</sup> but after the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien



Phu, Dulles succeeded in establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as an arrangement for internationalizing the war and sanctioning U. S. military intervention if necessary.<sup>9</sup>

In 1964 massive, direct intervention became necessary. SEATO was ineffective, however, and could provide only a weak legal rationalization for U. S. actions; the organization never took important military or political collective action. Therefore, in November 1964 the Johnson administration developed a hasty strategy with military/diplomatic elements: a "More Flags" campaign to involve additional countries in South Vietnam on an ad hoc basis. "More Flags" was intended to establish a pragmatic justification for U. S. intervention — the visible, committed presence of allies who would associate themselves with U. S. actions in Vietnam, militarily, if only in a token way, and diplomatically. Allies would be the functional equivalent of collective action by SEATO or the United Nations. Their major political value to the Johnson administration was to make it appear that U. S. intervention had broad international support.

The U. S. tried in 1964 and 1965 by appeals, threats, aid and monetary inducements to involve European and other governments in Vietnam. The diplomatic blitzkrieg failed.<sup>10</sup> The strategy to internationalize the war resulted in troop commitments by only a few governments: Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea.

#### **The South Korean Expeditionary Force in Vietnam**

South Korea was receptive to the 1964 U. S. appeal and made one of the few "meaningful commitments." South Korean troop deployments to Vietnam were made in four major increments as shown in Table 1. Each was secretly arranged by the United States, although American and South Korean officials conspired to maintain the public appearance that the original requests came from South Vietnam.

In February 1965, carefully maintaining the ruse that the request had initiated from the R.V.N., the R.O.K. sent two thousand non-combat medical and engineer troops to Vietnam. These forces, coyly designated the "Dove Unit," were to be a preparatory and humane cosmetic for the subsequent introduction of thousands of South Korean combat troops. President Johnson "noted with deep appreciation the contribution of the Republic of Korea towards the defense of Viet-Nam."<sup>11</sup>

The U. S. effort to introduce South Korean and other foreign troops into Vietnam in April 1965 met unexpected resistance, not from the "allies" but from the Vietnamese themselves. Chester Cooper has written that "one of the more exasperating aspects" of the U. S. attempt to involve other countries in Vietnam was "the lassitude, even disinterest of the Saigon government." Saigon saw the program as "a public relations campaign directed at the American people."<sup>12</sup> For once Saigon was correct.

On April 15, 1965, Washington instructed Ambassador Taylor in Saigon to "discuss with GVN introduction of R.O.K. regimental combat teams and suggest GVN request such a force ASAP."<sup>13</sup> Taylor, somewhat startled by the rapidity of Washington's buildup and introduction of foreign troops, reported that South Vietnam would not welcome R.O.K. troops. Taylor cabled the State Department on April 17 that "it is not going to be easy to

Table 1

## South Korean Troop Deployments to Vietnam

Dispatched	Organization	Strength
1964-65	Med/Engr (DOVE)	2,128
1965	Tiger Div (-RCT) w/supt forces and "Blue Dragon" Marine brigade	18,904
1966	9th Div (+Regimental Combat Team and Support forces)	23,865
1967	Marine battalion and other support forces	2,963
1969	Authorized increase C-46 crews	12
Total		47,872

Source: U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements Abroad, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 1544 (hereafter cited as Symington Subcommittee Hearings). The figure of 47,872 troops was the official maximum number of South Korean troops deployed to Vietnam. However, as noted above, the annual rotation of troops at the end of their tours of duty raised the total number of South Korean troops dispatched to Vietnam to over 300,000.

get ready concurrence for the large-scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit." Taylor requested new instructions to persuade the South Vietnamese to accept the Korean troops.

The Taylor-Washington colloquy illustrates that the central U. S. purpose in putting South Korean and other foreign troops in Vietnam was not military necessity but to assuage domestic opinion. The administration needed the semblance of "allied" cooperation to mask the American takeover of the war. With American support contingent upon acceptance of Korean and other foreign troops, South Vietnam had no choice but to acquiesce and request aid from its new found "allies." Taylor obtained R.V.N. agreement to the introduction of U. S. and other foreign troops in late April.

U.S.-R.O.K. negotiations on the dispatch of R.O.K. troops shifted to the highest level. Presidents Johnson and Park Chung Hee met in Washington in May 1965, and discussed the issue. The joint statement released on May 18 contained no mention of the troop issue. Secret negotiations began in June and agreement was reached in July 1965.<sup>14</sup> The terms of that agreement are shown below. South Korean troop deployments began in September, and the first Korean troops were in position in Vietnam in October.



Even before the R.O.K. Tiger Division reached Vietnam, American strategists anticipated the need for more South Koreans during Phase II, July 1965 to May 1966, of the United States build-up. On July 2, 1965, John T. McNaughton evaluated a request from General Westmoreland for an additional nine R.O.K. battalions. McNaughton noted that "with respect to 3d-country forces, West[moreland] has equated the 9 ROK battalions with 9 US battalions, saying that if he did not get the former, he must have the latter." The importance of the R.O.K. troops in 1965-66 was underlined by McNaughton's comment that "it might save us time if we assumed that we would get no meaningful forces from anyone other than the ROKs during the relative time frame."<sup>15</sup>

On November 23, 1965, General Westmoreland wrote that he needed "as an absolute minimum" an "ROK division (or US division) to II Corps, for location at coastal bases near Duc My, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, and Phan Rang . . . ." General Westmoreland explained the tactical use of the South Korean troops and said his "preferred course of action" would require approximately twenty-three thousand R.O.K. troops plus other U.S. troops.<sup>16</sup> Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara visited Saigon from November 28-30 and got the request for South Korean troops directly from Westmoreland.<sup>17</sup> Upon his return to Washington McNamara prepared a memorandum to President Johnson, dated December 7, 1965, recommending that "'to provide what it takes in men and materiel . . . to stick with our stated objectives and with the war' . . . the deployment of one Korean division plus another brigade, an additional Australian battalion, and 40 U.S. combat battalions . . . ." <sup>18</sup>

The urgent task of recruiting additional South Korean troops, and thus easing domestic pressure on the administration, fell to Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey flew to Seoul in January 1966 for preliminary discussions with President Park about another division for Westmoreland. These talks apparently ended without an agreement.<sup>19</sup> The importance of additional TCMFs, especially the South Koreans, is clear from the record of the Honolulu Conference, February 7-9, 1966, at which Westmoreland's troop and logistical needs were discussed in great detail. Manpower — providing Westmoreland the men he needed without increasing the U.S. draft or mobilizing the reserves — was a paramount objective for U.S. war planners. For example, a section of the summary of the Honolulu Conference entitled "Call-Up of Reserves" examined the reserve issue as a domestic problem and concluded that "it is a very difficult and delicate task for the Administration to mobilize and maintain the required support in this country to carry on the war properly."<sup>20</sup> McNamara assigned Thomas D. Morris, assistant secretary for manpower, the responsibility for various manpower requirements, including a project on the "use of third country forces."<sup>21</sup>

The administration's near desperation explains the soaring exuberance of Vice President Humphrey when he went to Seoul again in February 1966. To persuade the South Koreans of America's devotion and get an additional division, he lapsed into hyperbolic language.

"As long as there is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarcation line, the whole and entire power of the United States of America is committed to the security and defense of Korea. Korea today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. America today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. We are allies, we are friends, you should have no questions and no doubts."<sup>22</sup>



Senator Fulbright later termed Humphrey's remark "flamboyant rhetoric" and wondered how far beyond the commitments of the Mutual Defense Treaty the vice president had gone to get the South Korean soldiers.<sup>23</sup>

The R.O.K. perhaps agreed because it demanded written assurances of the American commitment and raised the price substantially for the Ninth Division. Ambassador Brown submitted back to back letters on March 7 and March 8 reassuring the R.O.K. that its security would not be endangered by sending more troops to Vietnam.<sup>24</sup> These letters were reportedly used by the R.O.K. government in secret discussions with the National Assembly regarding the troop issue.<sup>25</sup> Finally, the South Koreans, fully appreciating their strong bargaining position, extracted the famous Brown Memorandum (described in detail below) from the American side in return for the agreement to dispatch the Ninth Division. Westmoreland got his R.O.K. troops. He had asked for approximately twenty-three thousand; South Korea provided 23,865 in 1966.

No sooner had the agreement for the R.O.K. Ninth Division been signed than General Westmoreland began planning for still more South Korean troops. In June 1966 Westmoreland presented his adjusted 1966 requirements and his 1967 requirements. In 1967 he wanted an additional six R.O.K. battalions "to round out the ROK Marine Brigade to a Division."<sup>26</sup> Pentagon studies and estimates of manpower needs continued through the summer and fall of 1966. By April 1967 Westmoreland was counting upon a total of 60,000 R.O.K. troops "no later than June 1968."<sup>27</sup> The Westmoreland request for a total of 210,000 men set the DOD thinking how it could get more troops from the Asian "allies." On May 4 McNaughton ordered that "an analysis of South Vietnamese troop deployments in relation to population of the participating countries be prepared. This analysis, based upon population of the countries involved, concluded that for an increase of 100,000 U.S. troops the 'allocable' share for various countries would range from 15.5 thousand for Korea to 53.4 thousand for Indonesia."<sup>28</sup> A week later Walt W. Rostow proposed a "troop community chest operation for Vietnam" under a formula which would result in an additional 18,700 men from South Korea.<sup>29</sup>

By early July the question of "additional troops from our allies" for South Vietnam was of primary concern to Johnson's chief advisors. The Pentagon Papers provide a detailed resume in a memorandum dated July 13, 1967, for Rusk, McNamara, Rostow and Katzenbach on the subject of "Messages to Manila Nations and Possibilities for Additional Troop Contributions." The memorandum was prepared by William P. Bundy following a luncheon with the president and led to a series of blunt requests for additional forces. Regarding South Korea, "Park himself seemed to be willing . . . but it was clear that he intended to get his political situation straightened out before he moved with any additional forces for the United States. At best Korea appeared to be a prospect for action in late fall with perhaps an additional division coming by the end of the year . . ."<sup>30</sup>

One result of this discussion was a tour by General Maxwell Taylor and Clark Clifford from July 22 to August 5, 1967, to the troop contributing countries seeking additional TCMFs.<sup>31</sup> Subsequent negotiations brought an agreement by U.S.-R.O.K. officials for the dispatch of an additional "light division" of Korean troops to Vietnam in 1968.<sup>32</sup>

However, direct military pressure by North Korea in early January 1968 forced cancellation of the deployment. On January 22, 1968, North Korean commandoes staged a spectacular assault on President Park's residence in an attempted assassination. A day later North Korea seized the U.S. intelligence ship **Pueblo**. Both North Korean actions were interpreted as diversionary thrusts against South Korea to reduce the R.O.K. capability in Vietnam. The apparent willingness of North Korea to take significant military actions, the relative weakness of the U.S. command in South Korea because of deployment of aircraft to Vietnam, and increased public uneasiness in South Korea over the adequacy of defenses compelled the R.O.K. leadership to cancel the dispatch of further troops. South Korea even threatened to withdraw its forces from Vietnam precipitously to meet the North Korean challenge.<sup>33</sup> The unavailability of additional "allied" forces in the middle of the Tet crisis was a factor in the rejection of General Westmoreland's request for more than two hundred thousand U.S. troops and the imposition of a ceiling on the deployment of U.S. forces in Vietnam. The deployment of South Korean troops to Vietnam had ended.

South Korean troops began withdrawing from Vietnam in 1971 as part of the U.S. reduction of ground forces. Approximately twelve thousand marines were removed, but about thirty-eight thousand troops remained in Vietnam until the truce agreement was signed in January 1973. There were actually far more South Korean combat forces in Vietnam than American over the last months before the signing. South Korean troops were airlifted back to South Korea by the United States in February and March 1973. The South Korean expeditionary force to Vietnam officially ended operations on March 15, 1973.

#### **The U.S.-R.O.K. Agreement: Money for Men**

The United States secretly paid a high price in dollars and military and economic aid to obtain the 1965 deployment of South Korean troops to Vietnam.<sup>34</sup> However, by 1966 it was even more of a seller's market, and the extraordinary Brown Memorandum, dated March 4, 1966, became the basic arrangement for the United States utilization of R.O.K. forces throughout the war. South Korea demanded the memorandum as a formal statement of U.S. payments and aid for R.O.K. troops. Virtually all aspects of U.S. official involvement in South Korea were engaged in the various forms of payments. Particularly noteworthy were the use of the Agency for International Development (AID) and the assistance given to South Korean capitalists to profit from the war. Seldom have the links between AID/economic assistance, U. S. military/political objectives, and the pursuit of war profits in the name of economic development been so explicitly revealed.

The 1966 Brown Memorandum provided the following:

##### **A. Military Assistance**

1. To provide over the next few years substantial items of equipment for the modernization of Republic of Korea forces in Korea.
2. To equip as necessary, and finance all additional won (ROK currency) costs of, the additional forces deployed to the Republic of Vietnam.
3. To equip, provide for the training and finance complete replacement of the additional forces deployed to the Republic of Vietnam.



4. To contribute to filling the requirements determined by our two Governments to be necessary, following completion of a Joint United States-Republic of Korea study, for the improvement of the Republic of Korea anti-infiltration capability.

5. To provide equipment to expand the Republic of Korea arsenal for increased ammunition production in Korea.

6. To provide communications facilities for exclusive Republic of Korea use, the character of which is to be agreed between United States and Republic of Korea officials in Seoul and Saigon. These facilities will meet requirements for communication with your forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

7. To provide four C-54 aircraft to the Republic of Korea Air Force for support of Republic of Korea forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

8. To provide for the improvement of military barracks and bachelor officers quarters and related facilities for troop welfare such as cooking, messing, sanitation and recreational facilities from proceeds of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) excess sales.

9. To assume the costs of overseas allowances to these forces at the scale agreed between General Beach and Minister of National Defense Kim Sung Eun on March 4, 1966.

10. To provide death and disability gratuities resulting from casualties in Vietnam at double the rates recently agreed to by the Joint United States-Republic of Korea Military Committee.

#### B. Economic Assistance

1. To release additional won to the Korean budget equal to all of the net additional costs of the deployment of these extra forces and of mobilizing and maintaining in Korea the activated reserve division and brigade and support elements.

2. To suspend the MAP transfer program for as long as there are substantial Republic of Korea forces, i.e., at least two divisions, in the Republic of Vietnam with offshore procurement in Korea in United States fiscal year 1967 of items suspended in fiscal year 1966 plus those on the fiscal year 1967 list.

3. (a) to procure in Korea insofar as practicable requirements for supplies, services and equipment for Republic of Korea forces in the Republic of Vietnam and to direct to Korea selected types of procurement for United States and Republic of Vietnam forces in the Republic of Vietnam . . . .

(b) to procure in Korea, in competition only with United States suppliers, as much as Korea can provide in time and at a reasonable price of a substantial amount of goods being purchased by the Agency for International Development (AID) for use in its project programs for rural construction, pacification, relief, logistics, and so forth, in the Republic of Vietnam.

(c) to the extent permitted by the Republic of Vietnam, to provide Korean contractors expanded opportunities to participate in construction projects undertaken by the United States Government and by American contractors in the Republic of Vietnam and to provide other services, including employment of skilled Korean civilians in the Republic of Vietnam.

4. To increase its technical assistance to the Republic of Korea in the general field of export promotion.

5. To provide, in addition to the \$150 million AID loans already committed to the Republic of Korea in May, 1965, additional AID loans to support the economic development of the Republic of Korea as suitable projects are developed under the same spirit and considerations which apply to the \$150 million commitment.

Table 2

## U. S. PAYMENTS TO SOUTH KOREA UNDER BROWN MEMORANDUM (in Millions of Dollars)

	Fiscal Year						Subtotal
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970 <sup>1</sup>	
U. S. support:							
a. Transportation of pers/equip <sup>2</sup>							
b. Table of Equipment Fill (100 %) of RR Div		6.4					6.4
c. Overseas Allowances	.367	8.863	29.754	35.848	37.036	18.200	130.2
d. Death and disability		.654	1.690	3.439	2.872	1.800	10.5
e. Equip Forces Deployed	0	3.900	.700	.700			5.3
f. Improve Firepower Mobility and Communications of ROKA and ROKMC Forces in Country <sup>3</sup>							
g. Med Evac to Korea <sup>4</sup>							
h. Modernize Forces in Korea		10.0	10.0				20.0
i. Finance Net Additional Costs			5.896	14.713	14.824	9.400	44.8
j. Reconstituted Deployed Forces		25.600	4.800	9.800	7.400	4.300	51.9
k. Contribute to Counterinfiltration Requirement <sup>5</sup>		.200	.200	5.400	.500	.200	6.5
l. Provide Equip for ROK Arsenal Expansion <sup>6</sup>			2.600				2.6
m. Provide Sole-use Communication Facilities			1.314		.007	.38	1.4
n. Provide 4 C-54 Aircraft		1.200	.600	.400	1.200	.400	3.8
o. Provide improvement of Military Barracks and Sanitation Facilities from Military Assistance Program (MAP) Proceeds of MAP Excess Sales			.657	.583		.477	1.7
p. MAP Transfer Suspended		4.600	10.300	18.400	27.100	32.800	93.2
q. Provide Combat Rations				6.100	12.300	5.600	24.0
r. Procurements in Korea <sup>6</sup>		9.6	11.9	15.2	9.1	5.0	50.8
s. Expand Korea Contractor Opportunities <sup>7</sup>							305.4
t. Procurement of Military Goods and Services for U.S. Forces		32.0	32.0	32.0	32.0	16.0	144.0
u. Military Sea Transport System Contracts		3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.5	14.5
v. Temporary Duty Support				.9	.8	.4	2.1
w. Special Leave Support					.7	.7	1.4
x. Assistance in Kind	.09	.7	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.1	7.0
Total Costs, Fiscal Years 1965 - 70							927.5

Source: Symington Subcommittee Hearings, p. 1545.

<sup>1</sup>Data for the period January 1970 to March 15, 1973, were not available. There were no U.S. costs in Korea during FY 1964 in support of R.O.K. forces deployed to Vietnam. FY 1970 figures reflect the costs from 1 July 1969 through 31 December 1969.

<sup>2</sup>Cost of troop and military equipment shipments were not available.

<sup>3</sup>Costs included in \$10,000,000 add-on to fiscal year 1966 Korea MAP as shown in Item h.

<sup>4</sup>These costs controlled by COMUSMACV.

<sup>5</sup>In addition, \$9,200,000 were absorbed within the two \$10,000,000 add-on packages of fiscal year 1966 and fiscal year 1967 as shown in Item h.

<sup>6</sup>An additional \$1,700,000 was absorbed in the \$10,000,000 added-on in fiscal year 1967; an additional \$900,000 was absorbed in fiscal year 1968 MAP.

<sup>7</sup>Costs not available by fiscal year.



6. If justified by performance under the 1966 Stabilization Program, to provide \$15 million of Program Loans in 1966, which can be used for the support of exports to the Republic of Vietnam and for other development needs.<sup>35</sup>

Some of the payments made under the terms of the Brown Memorandum for the period 1965 to December 1969 are shown in Table 2.

The Brown Memorandum shows the range of "benefits" the United States provided South Korea in payment for troops. Two elements of that package will be examined more closely: overseas allowances and assistance to R.O.K. business operations in Vietnam.

#### Overseas Allowances

The R.O.K. and U.S. governments claimed repeatedly that the South Korean troops dispatched to Vietnam were highly motivated volunteers who desired to serve their country and defend the "Free World." However, the United States agreed in the initial 1964 negotiations to pay a special overseas allowance to all South Korean troops, in addition to their normal salaries, as a special bonus. The 1964 rates are shown in Table 3.

Table 3

#### 1964 OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES TO SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS

Rank	Per Diem	Rank	Per Diem
Colonel	\$6.50	Master Sergeant	\$2.50
Lieutenant Colonel	6.00	Sergeant 1st Class	2.00
Major	5.50	Sergeant	1.50
Captain	5.50	Corporal	1.20
1st Lieutenant	4.50	Private 1st Class	1.00
2nd Lieutenant	4.00	Private	1.00

Source: Symington Subcommittee Hearings, p. 1708.

These special payments were insufficient to induce volunteers in the lowest four enlisted grades, those ranks where discipline is harshest, danger greatest, and casualties highest. In 1965 the R.O.K. requested a 20-25 percent increase in the overseas allowance of the four lowest ranks to attract volunteers for Vietnam. The United States agreed to the increased in July 1966.<sup>36</sup> The new schedule of payments for the four lowest ranks is shown in Table 4.



Table 4

## OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES

Rank	1964	1966
Sergeant	\$1.50	\$1.80
Corporal	1.20	1.50
Private 1st Class	1.00	1.35
Private	1.00	1.25

Source: Symington Subcommittee Hearings, p. 1572.

The economic significance of these payments may be seen in the contrast with the regular salary scale of the ROKA. The monthly basic pay for the ROKA in Vietnam (as of July 1, 1969) is shown in Table 5.

Table 5

## ROKA MONTHLY BASIC PAY

Rank	Pay	Rank	Pay
Lieutenant General	\$300.00	Warrant Officer	\$85.00
Major General	242.00	Master Sergeant	61.00
Brigadier General	217.00	Sergeant 1st Class	54.00
Colonel	194.00	Staff Sergeant	8.00
Lieutenant Colonel	156.00	Sergeant	2.60
Major	119.00	Corporal	2.00
Captain	91.00	Private 1st Class	1.80
1st Lieutenant	60.00	Private	1.60
2nd Lieutenant	47.00		

Source: Symington Subcommittee Hearings, p. 1572.

The **monthly** salary of a Private was \$1.60. The daily U.S.-paid overseas allowance for service in Vietnam was \$1.25, the monthly total was \$37.50. The U.S. overseas allowance for an ROKA Private was more than twenty-three times his normal base pay. As a percentage of base pay the overseas allowances decreased proportionate to rank. For example, a Lt. General received a monthly overseas allowance of \$300, and his base pay was also \$300. For the professional soldier the special payments were a benefit but other considerations — promotion and career advancement — were probably more important. For the lowest ranks, which were filled by conscription, career was not a factor and material rewards were neces-

sary. Those rewards were substantial. Table 2 shows overseas allowance payments of \$130.2 million to December 31, 1969. Bank of Korea figures indicate that South Korean troops remitted \$208.3 million through the end of 1972.<sup>37</sup>

Senator William Fulbright released 1965 correspondence between the U.S. Army and the R.O.K. Ministry of Defense which showed that: (1) the South Korean army needed special bonus payments to insure enough "volunteers" for Vietnam and (2) the U.S. Army attempted to keep the bonus payments secret, fearing both that the price for Thai and Filipino troops might rise or that Congress would discover and end the payments.<sup>38</sup> In a sharp exchange with administration witnesses U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William J. Porter, former Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown and General Michaelis, Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army, South Korea, during the Symington Subcommittee hearings, Fulbright asked if there were precedents in American experience for paying "allowances of this character to individual soldiers in another country?" The three administration spokesmen admitted that they knew of none.<sup>39</sup> However, Porter, born in England (he is a naturalized U.S. citizen), was more familiar with the British colonial policy of the "silver bullet," the use of colonial troops to keep order in the empire, and volunteered that "there are precedents of other governments doing it." Fulbright pressed the issue.

" . . . I am trying to get at the bottom of the significance of this relationship because here again I think this is a matter about which the Congress and the people ought to know. They ought not to be under illusions of this character involving so much money. This is all a part of the question of whether what we are doing in Vietnam is in the interests of the United States . . . . It is something we ought to understand. We are not experts. We have not had a long history in the hiring of mercenaries, have we? We have helped countries in Europe, but I don't know of a precedent of this kind where we double the salary of the foreign troops to volunteer, as they call it, to fight for us . . . ." <sup>40</sup>

Unimpressed with the evasive replies of Brown, Porter and Michaelis, Fulbright concluded:

" . . . it seems to me the fact that we paid them on this basis is all the more inexcusable. I see no reason for doubling their salaries, if they figure they are not mercenary, if they are doing their duty under their national honor, if you want to call it that . . . ." <sup>41</sup>

Fulbright was neither peevish nor without support in his judgment of "allied" motivations in Vietnam. Cooper writes casually that "the only nonmercenary third country allies we had in Vietnam were Australia and New Zealand."<sup>42</sup> The Symington Subcommittee's final report in December 1970 took special, critical note of the bonus payments.

"The extraordinary payment of special allowances to the Korean, Thai and Filipino forces that were sent to Vietnam — particularly the manner in which the allowances were hidden from the American people — had substantial impact abroad as well as in this country. In particular, the ability of the Executive branch to keep



such information hidden, not only from the American people but even from Congress, told the foreign governments concerned what they could expect from our Government in its dealing with its own people . . . ." <sup>43</sup>

#### U. S. Assistance to R.O.K. Business Operations in Vietnam

The Brown Memorandum promised American assistance to help South Korea obtain a share of the war profits in Vietnam. William Porter described the relationship in business-like fashion:

"The Koreans felt it only reasonable that if they were sending men in large numbers to fight in Vietnam, they should be allowed to share in markets created by the war. In other words, they wanted to participate in the opportunities as well as the risks." <sup>44</sup>

The major forms of U.S. commercial assistance were procurement of war supplies in South Korea and construction/service contracts for R.O.K. firms in Vietnam. Among the major South Korean exports to Vietnam were military uniforms, jungle boots, corrugated metal roofing and cement. In the construction and service field, at one point more than eighty South Korean companies held contracts with the U.S. government in Vietnam. Their activities included construction and engineering, transportation of goods, and operating service facilities such as laundry shops and entertainments clubs. South Korean civilian workers in Vietnam were especially well rewarded. According to U.S. government estimates, there were sixteen thousand South Korean foreign contract workers in Vietnam (of a total of twenty-five thousand). Their annual earnings were \$8,400 — compared to an average of about \$200 in South Korea. <sup>45</sup> South Korean foreign exchange earnings from Vietnam by these commercial activities are shown in Table 6.

Table 6

#### FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNED BY COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	Calendar Year							Total
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	
Construction and services	\$12.5	40.2	49.0	37.5	45.8	34.8	12.3	
Remittances by civilian technicians	9.1	34.3	33.6	43.1	26.9	15.3	3.9	
Military goods	9.9	14.5	30.8	23.6	24.3	21.2	15.0	
Total	31.5	89.0	113.4	104.2	97.0	71.3	31.2	\$537.6

Source: ROK Foreign Exchange Earnings from USFK and Vietnam



South Korean businessmen benefitted in other ways from the R.O.K. expeditionary force in Vietnam. For example, commercial exports to Vietnam were surely related to the degree of political and military influence South Korea could wield in Saigon. In the same way, the enormous expansion of R.O.K. exports to the United States was facilitated by the South Korean role of loyal "ally" in Vietnam. These profits do not appear as direct foreign exchange earnings from the R.O.K. expeditionary force nor can they be calculated from the available data.

U.S. payments to South Korea extended far beyond the special allowances paid to individual R.O.K. soldiers to fight in Vietnam or the profitable contracts made with particular South Korean companies for services rendered in the war. The continued presence of American troops in South Korea, a demand of the R.O.K., was a dole of hundreds of millions of dollars. South Korea earned \$931.9 million in foreign exchange from 1966 to 1972 from the American forces.<sup>46</sup> This official figure is probably low.

The "modernization" of South Korean military equipment, another promise of the Brown Memorandum, is proving to be very expensive. The increase in military aid to South Korea after the 1966 agreement is striking (see Table 7).

Table 7

## MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH KOREA (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

<u>U. S. Fiscal Year</u>								
1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
122.7	112.5	228.1	432.2	656.3	418.9	371.5	597.9	454.0

Source: Compiled from data provided the U.S. Embassy, Seoul, in December 1972, and the U.S. State Department, March 1973.

From 1966 the United States has provided South Korea with approximately \$3,158,000,000 in military assistance. Not all of this military aid is directly attributable to the Brown Memorandum, to U.S. "gratitude" for South Korean troops. Military aid for arms "modernization" would have been provided to South Korea even if the R.O.K. had not provided forces for the Vietnam War. It appears, however, that the total would have been far less, not only because the MAP Transfer Program would not have been suspended in 1966 but because the R.O.K. would have less leverage in negotiations with the U.S. It is also possible that the R.O.K. "need" for armaments would have been much less if the U.S. and South Korea had not exacerbated tensions in Northeast Asia by using South Korean forces in Vietnam.

It may not ever be possible to state exactly the total amount of the various kinds of payments made by the United States to South Korea from 1964 to 1973 in return for the R.O.K. expeditionary force. Whatever the precise figure, the lesson of the U.S.-R.O.K. agreement and these payments is politically and morally clear: the United States **bought** the South Korean expeditionary force to Vietnam.

## Notes

1. The facts about U.S. recruitment and funding of South Korean and other TCMFs were kept secret even from the Congress, except for some pro-war senators, until 1970. The data released as a result of Senate hearings is still incomplete, with much of the more sensitive aspects highly classified. The Pentagon Papers filled some of the lacunae but not all.
2. Two examples are Chester Cooper, **The Last Crusade, The Full Story of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam from Roosevelt to Nixon** (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1970), p. 267; and the comment of Charles P. Shirkey in Earl Ravenal, ed., **Peace With China?** (New York, Liveright, 1971), pp. 151-52. This writer has questioned other officials and academic strategists about the mercenary title; they have, with one exception, termed the South Korean military force a mercenary army. South Koreans or American apologists who find this a repugnant description would do well to review the South Korean press for the war years, especially in February and March 1973 as the R.O.K. intervention came to an end. The emphasis on how much money was "earned" in Vietnam and what a commercial success the war was should dispel any misgivings about the term mercenary. This is not to say, however, that all South Korean troops went to Vietnam just for the money. At least in the beginning, most were so indoctrinated with anti-communism that a kind of blood lust revenge against the "communist conspiracy" was a factor. This became less important as the war continued.
3. **United States - Vietnam Relations, 1945 - 1967**, U.S. Department of Defense (Washington, D. C., 1971), p. 419.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 409-410.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 291-94, 359, 367-69, 436-38, and 451-55.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 501. See also pp. 388-91.
9. The formation is of SEATO as described in *Ibid.*, Vol. 10.
10. Cooper, **The Last Crusade**, p. 266.
11. **Symington Subcommittee Hearings**, p. 1718.
12. Cooper, **The Last Crusade**, p. 266.
13. Neil Sheehan et al., **The Pentagon Papers** (New York, Bantam Books, 1971), p. 444.
14. **Symington Subcommittee Hearings**, p. 1708.
15. Senator Gravel Edition, **The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam** (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971), Vol. 4, p. 292 (hereafter cited as Gravel, Pentagon Papers).
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 305-06.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 308.




18. *Ibid.*, pp. 308-09.
19. Chong-Shin Kim, **Seven Years with Korea's Park Chung-hee** (Seoul, Hollym Corp., 1967), pp. 264-66.
20. Gravel, **Pentagon Papers**, Vol. 4, p. 314.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
22. **Symington Subcommittee Hearings**, p. 1725.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 1536.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 1529-30.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 1532.
26. Gravel, **Pentagon Papers**, Vol. 4, p. 325.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 440.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 469-70.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 523-24.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
32. John B. Henry II, "February 1968," **Foreign Policy** No. 4 (Fall 1971), p. 10.
33. See Frank Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire: Reflections on the USS Pueblo," **Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars**, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1972), pp. 54-74.
34. **Symington Subcommittee Hearings**, p. 1708.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 1549-50.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 1563, 1569. Nevertheless, the enormous disparity between rich America and poor South Korea remained in the relative expenses to maintain soldiers in Vietnam. The Pentagon estimated the costs at \$5,000 per ROK soldier compared to \$13,000 per American. The DOD thus regarded the South Koreans as a "bargain."
37. **ROK Foreign Exchange Earnings from USFK and Vietnam**, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, Republic of Korea, February 8, 1973.
38. **Symington Subcommittee Hearings**, pp. 1553-54.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 1566.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 1567-68.
42. Cooper, **The Last Crusade**, p. 267.
43. **Symington Subcommittee Hearings**, p. 2438.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 1708.
45. **New York Times**, January 25, 1971.
46. **ROK Foreign Exchange Earnings from USFK and Vietnam**.


**ALLIES CALLED KOREANS – A REPORT FROM VIETNAM**

**By Diane and Michael Jones**





PROVINCE ---  
 District .....  
 VILLAGE - - -  
 Hamlet .....





## ALLIES CALLED KOREANS — A REPORT FROM VIETNAM

by Diane and Michael Jones

"We have come to set forth from earlier days a code of conduct to be observed by every individual soldier emphasizing that '100 enemies can be let loose, but no damaging to even a single one of innocent civilian people,' which has been strictly enforced to entire members of ROK Forces in Vietnam, and, in fact, has become lately our creed of life."

— Lt. General Lee Sae Ho, Commander, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam.

"The Koreans had only to hear one shot ring out, and the nearest hamlet would lose 90 people." — A member of the village council, Binh Duong Village, South Vietnam.

Anh Hai\* lived in Son Loc village, a few kilometers west of National Highway 1, not far from Quang Ngai city. The only permanent allied presence near his home was a small hill-top post called Nui Tron where 100 troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and a few Korean advisors were stationed. Anh Hai told us that the people in his village paid taxes to the National Liberation Front, but its military presence was limited to a few local guerrillas. Here is Anh Hai's account of an operation by South Korean marines of the Blue Dragon Brigade into his village:

"On November 9, 1966, when I was only fifteen, I was visiting friends in Dien Nien hamlet not far from my home. We saw a large force of soldiers approaching on foot, but thought they were ARVNs and kept on playing. The men who had not already gone to work in the fields hid, as they did when any army approached. The rest of us weren't afraid because when Vietnamese or American soldiers had come to our village they hadn't hurt the people. By the time we realized these troops were Koreans it was too late to hide even if we'd wanted to.

"When they reached the village they ordered all the people into a large group. All they could say in Vietnamese was 'di, di' (go, go). They had no interpreter. They pulled 15 or so old men and boys out of the crowd, lined us up and made us kneel a few yards from the others. They forced a 13 year old boy at one end of the line to stand in front of the group and asked him several questions in Korean. Of course neither he nor any of the rest of us could understand what they were saying. When he didn't reply for several minutes they led him to one side, shot him, and threw his body into a hole.

"Then they picked out a second boy and beat him terribly before asking him, 'Can you speak English?' I spoke up then, since I had studied it some in school. With the help of a Korean-Vietnamese dictionary and a little English I answered their questions about my name, age, and village. But when I said that I didn't know where the local Viet Cong Command Post was, they put a gun to my throat.

---

\*Out of concern for their safety, we have not used the real names of villagers who gave us information.

"I would be dead now if at that moment the commander from the outpost at Nui Tron hadn't shown up with his Korean advisor. Together they told the Korean soldiers that the people in Dien Nien weren't "VC" and were under the control of the ARVN soldiers at the outpost. So the Koreans left, heading in the direction of An Tho hamlet.

"After a few minutes we heard a little shooting and guessed that they had encountered some local guerrillas. The fight must have made them angry because in An Tho they forced a group of seven children and an old man into an air raid bunker and threw a grenade in after them. Five of them were killed, but three survived the blast and told the story later.

"That afternoon I and most of the people in Dien Nien went to stay near the Nui Tron outpost until the Koreans were finished with their operation. But more than 50, perhaps up to 100, women and children stayed in their homes. At evening the Korean soldiers came back from An Tho and again gathered these people into a group. They passed out cakes and candies to the children. Then with machine guns and grenade launchers they killed them all. They left the bodies in a large pile. There were no survivors. We know they passed out candy because the men who went down from the hill and discovered the bodies two days later found pieces of it in the mouths and hands of the dead children."

We heard this story in March 1972, after we had been in Vietnam for a year and a half. For some time, we had been aware of vague reports about massacres committed by Korean troops, and after hearing Anh Hai's account, we decided to try to find out more. From May through August, 1972, we conducted 40 interview sessions, most of them with people from small villages or refugee camps in Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, Quang Nam and Binh Dinh provinces. In most cases we interviewed one or two people, often with onlookers adding comments or suggestions. At nine of the sessions held in refugee camps in Quang Nam, we met and interviewed large groups of people, often 10 or more, from the same village.

We concentrated our research in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces, where the Blue Dragon Marine Brigade operated from mid-1966 through 1971; we went to Binh Dinh only briefly to look into reports that Korean troops stationed there had also massacred civilians. We both speak Vietnamese and were able to conduct all the interviews ourselves, without an interpreter. Fortunately, we could often enlist the aid of local religious leaders, whose introductions enabled us to meet and talk with many rural people who otherwise would have been inaccessible to us and reluctant to talk openly with any foreigner. In almost every case, the interviews were with residents of the same village or hamlet\* where a particular incident was said to have occurred. In some cases, our informants told us they were eye-witnesses to the event; more often they said they had escaped the area in time to avoid becoming victims themselves.

---

\* "Village" and "hamlet" are inexact translations for terms denoting divisions of the Vietnamese countryside into administrative units. "Xa," or village, might be better understood as "village-area," meaning a large area of countryside, usually with a farming population of from 5,000 to 20,000. A village is in turn sub-divided into several smaller units called "Ap" (sometimes "Thon"), or hamlet. A hamlet is also an area of land including rice fields and small clusters of houses or neighborhoods called "xom."



Most people did not really warm up to talking until we explained that we had no connection with any government and that our purpose in listening to their stories was to write an account for the press. Although most of the incidents we heard about occurred from three to six years before our interviews, people were still afraid to discuss them with us for fear of reprisals from the Saigon government. Over the years the Vietnamese have learned that to say anything with political significance can bring very serious trouble.

Another difficulty which we encountered in trying to follow up stories of South Korean activities was that, ironically, many of the areas which Korean troops had "pacified" were again "insecure" by the summer of 1972. In Quang Ngai, Quang Tin and Binh Dinh provinces it was impossible for us to visit the site of any one of the massacres which we heard about. Accounts of incidents in these provinces had to be obtained from refugees now living in the cities or in camps along National Highway 1. In Quang Nam we were able to visit Saigon government relocation centers of "Return to Village" camps in a number of villages in one district. Other areas of Quang Nam where the ROK marines operated were insecure and we could not visit them.

Such problems in locating and talking with people placed limitations on the amount of research we could do. The fact that we heard as much as we did within a limited area and limited amount of time indicates to us that probably many more massacres were committed by South Korean troops, but remain unknown to the public outside the areas where they occurred.

In trying to gather data, we were fortunate that people we talked to could frequently remember exact dates of massacres, according to the lunar calendar. This is because in Vietnamese tradition, the death anniversaries of family members are commemorated each year with prayers and offerings. For cases in which none of their relatives were killed, people could usually only supply the approximate month or time of year. Even the people who knew the precise day and month, however, sometimes could not clearly remember the year.

We were often impressed with how little the stories of massacres and atrocities spread among the people. We had to remind ourselves that the specific incidents we were investigating were but one factor in the massive destruction and disruption the war has brought to the people we met. In many cases, these people suffered more losses from bombing and artillery attacks on their villages than from the massacres which they told us about. This is one reason why these events which are to us atrocious and incredible often did not become widely noted as particularly out of the ordinary — or what has been too long "the ordinary" — for Vietnamese peasants.

After hearing many reports from villagers, we approached both the U. S. and Korean official military information offices and asked for dates, places, and results of Korean operations. Neither office gave us any useful information. There is evidence, however, that American authorities are not ignorant of atrocities committed by South Korean troops. We have heard from a reliable press source that there is a report in the U. S. advisors' headquarters in Hoi An, Quang Nam's provincial capital, which gives an account of Korean atrocities in Quang Nam. A U. S. foreign service officer in Vietnam who said that he read such a report added that the U. S. government has systematically suppressed this and other accounts of atrocities committed by American allies.



Our purpose in presenting the following accounts is not to provide absolute proof that certain specific events took place on certain days. Some of the dates we quote may be wrong, some of the details faulty. We believe, however, that because of the number and independent sources of these stories, they provide a significant statement about how ROK troops were used in Vietnam. What we present here are the accounts given to us by Vietnamese peasants who experienced, or whose families and friends experienced pacification carried out by the "Allies called Koreans."

#### **Quang Ngai Province, Son Tinh District**

Anh Hai told us that the Korean troops who killed the people in Dien Nien were on an operation that lasted about two weeks and covered several of the villages in western Son Tinh district. Ba Hai, an old woman from Phuoc Binh hamlet, also in Son Loc village, told us what happened there when the Koreans came.

"They first arrived in Phuoc Binh about 7 a.m. on November 9, 1966." (Three days before they came to Dien Nien.) "They stayed for two days, but never approached the people. They killed our livestock for food without asking or paying for it. During that time they didn't encounter any guerrillas or step on any mines. But on the morning of November 11 they started going from house to house in the hamlet, calling the people out and saying something to them in a foreign language. They had no interpreter with them. The men had already run up to the outpost at Nui Tron, so the only ones left were women and children and old people. When they came to my house and spoke to me I could only understand one word they said, "VC." I shook my head "No" and they let me go. I called my children and we picked up what we could carry and ran to Nui Tron.

"At that time most of the people had never heard the word "VC" and didn't know what it meant. So when the Korean soldiers talked to them they were very frightened and just did this —" Ba Hai clasped her hands in front of her and bowed slightly. "All the people who did that were killed; either shot in front of their houses or ordered inside and killed with grenades. Their houses were then burned. I think that maybe the Koreans took their polite bows as nods of admission that they were "VC" or "VC sympathizers," and that is why they killed them. In the whole hamlet only about 20-30 people were able to get away like my children and I did.

"When the men went back from Nui Tron to Phuoc Binh after 7 or 8 days, after the Koreans had left the area, they found about 140 bodies. Many of the dead children had in their mouths and hands bits of candy given to them by the Korean soldiers.

We learned of many other killings by ROK soldiers in western Son Tinh district, too many to relate in much detail here. Villagers told us that Korean soldiers killed groups of 20 to 100 people in the villages of Son Nam, Son Bac, Son Kim, Son Chau, Son Tra, Son Trung, and Son Dong, in addition to Son Loc where Dien Nien and Phuoc Binh hamlets are located. The average number killed in each of the incidents was over 50. Following are two examples of these massacres, both said to have occurred in late 1966, possibly as part of the same operation during which the massacres at Dien Nien and Phuoc Binh took place.

A patient in the Quang Ngai province hospital told us that Korean troops sweeping from house to house in An Binh and Dong Nhon hamlets of Son Dong village killed 46



people. Six of the victims were found at a small Cao Dai temple with their hands tied behind their backs. The patient, who was living in An Binh at the time, said she was able to take refuge for the duration of the Korean operation at the Nui Tron government outpost. When she returned to her hamlet afterwards she saw many of the bodies and a great number of burned houses.

We met a group of men at a refugee camp near Quang Ngai city. They told us, among many other incidents, that in December 1966 Korean forces rounded up about 200 people in Son Loc and Son Chau villages, led them to a remote place in eastern Son Loc, and killed them. There had been no fighting between the Koreans and the guerrillas that day, they said.

One particularly brutal incident this group of men told us about also happened in late 1966. They said that the South Koreans beheaded five children and carried their heads 15 kilometers out to National Highway 1 and dumped them there where many villagers had fled to seek security while the Korean operation was in progress. The Koreans' motive in displaying the heads, the men thought, was "to make the people afraid."

#### **Quang Ngai Province, Binh Son District, Binh Ky Village**

Some weeks after the large manoeuvre in Son Tinh district, Blue Dragon marines stationed to the north and across National Highway 1 in Binh Son district launched an operation into insecure parts of Binh Ky and Binh Thien villages. In interviews with people from Binh Ky, we heard that hundreds of unarmed civilians were killed on one day in the largest series of massacres we came across in the course of our investigation.

Anh Sau, a 35 year old patient at Quang Ngai province hospital, told the following story:

Early in the morning on December 6, 1966, South Korean soldiers from outposts in Binh Lien and Go Rong came down into Long Binh hamlet in Binh Ky. It was about 4 a.m. and the people hadn't eaten breakfast yet. The soldiers rounded up 30 people: women, children and old men. Anh Sau and all the other younger men had left their homes as they always did when there were soldiers in the area. The Koreans set fire to the houses in the hamlet and gathered all the people's belongings that they could find and threw them into the flames. Then the Koreans led the group of 30 to the top of a hill and made them stand at the edge of a bomb crater. They moved some distance away and set up large machine guns and mortars. They shot the people and their bodies either fell or were later pushed into the bomb crater. Anh Sau heard the shooting about 6 a.m. After the Korean troops left Long Binh, he said, they went on to other hamlets, continuing to massacre civilians and burn houses. When he and others who had fled returned to Long Binh three days later, they found that the bodies in the crater were beginning to rot and couldn't be pulled out, so they were covered with dirt and left there.

Anh Nam, now a schoolteacher in Quang Ngai city, was out in the fields when ROK marines entered his hamlet of An Phuoc, also in Binh Ky village, on the same morning. They passed out cakes to the children, he said, then herded all the people in his neighborhood together. Since the young men had all gone to the fields, only women, children and old men

were left at home. The Koreans ordered everybody to stand in a field near the houses and then set up three machine guns and a mortar. They fired into the crowd, killing everyone except an eight year old boy, Anh Nam's nephew, who somehow escaped harm as he fell among the pile of bodies. Not long after killing the people the Koreans withdrew to their camp near the highway and shelled An Phuoc with artillery.

Anh Nam heard the machine gun fire and saw the smoke from burning houses about 9 a.m. but he didn't dare go back to the hamlet until about four o'clock in the afternoon. When he did return, he said, he saw clearly one pile of 140 bodies. In other parts of the hamlet he saw two more piles of about 30 bodies each. After the Koreans left An Phuoc, they moved on to other hamlets, killing and burning. According to Anh Nam, as well as everyone else from Binh Ky whom we interviewed, there were no guerrilla soldiers in the village at the time of the massacre.

Refugees from Lac Son, another hamlet in Binh Ky village, told us that South Korean soldiers had come to their area several times before the massacre, starting in September-October 1966. On previous occasions, they said, the Koreans had not harmed the villagers and the people were not particularly afraid of them.

On the morning of December 6 several groups of ROK troops came on foot from their outpost at Chau Re down to Lac Son (also known as Phuoc Son). About 10 a.m. they started rounding the people up into groups.

One of the refugees, Anh Bay, a man of about 30, hid in some bushes within clear sight of the place where Korean soldiers rounded up a very large group of villagers at Xom Cau, part of Lac Son hamlet. As Anh Bay recalled the story for us he stared intensely into the wooden table in his refugee home, his face reflecting the horror of the scene he had witnessed six years ago:

"When they had gathered everyone together, they passed out candy to the children and cigarettes to the adults. I saw them separate out a group of women and lead them aside. When the women began to see what was going to happen, they clasped their hands and begged for mercy. . . but the Koreans shot them anyway. Then they turned their machine guns on the rest of the crowd, mostly women and children and old men, and shot them all.

"After that, they set up mines in the middle of the dead bodies to try to blow them up. They set off mine after mine, but eventually they stopped — there were just too many bodies.

"Around noon, about an hour after the Koreans left, I came out of my hiding place and went down to look at the bodies. I saw that there were still pieces of candy and cigarettes in some of their mouths. Then I walked over to An Phuoc hamlet where I met one old woman. She told me everybody else in the hamlet was dead. She pointed to a field close by where I saw a pile of bodies, and later I saw another pile, not far away. I helped to bury the bodies at both An Phuoc and Xom Cau."

Anh Bay estimated that the number of people killed that day in Binh Ky was over 1000. He said that there were 450 in the group in Xom Cau, where he was watching, and that he



saw about 350 and 150 bodies in two piles at An Phuoc. He added that the Koreans killed 100 - 150 people on the same day in a third location, Tan An, also a part of Lac Son hamlet.

Anh Bay's estimate of the total number of victims in this massacre was the highest of several we heard. Other people put the number at 600 - 700, still others at 400.

A social worker from Quang Ngai city told us that he was visiting Binh Ky village in 1970 on a flood relief mission when he found out about the massacres. He said he compiled a list of 718 names of people from the area of Lac Son and An Phuoc who were shot down by the Blue Dragon marines on December 6, 1966. The names were given to him by surviving relatives who signed their own names and gave their thumb prints to certify the truth of their assertions. The list was also signed and sealed by local government officials. In the hope that the incident could be publicized, the social worker gave it to a representative of the Saigon Student Union, but it was subsequently lost.

Anh Bay and others said that the figure of 718 on the social worker's list was low because it included only residents of Lac Son and An Phuoc. In fact, they said, a large number of people from nearby hamlets had fled to these places attempting to escape the Koreans on operation but were rounded up and killed with the others, especially at Xom Cau.

### **Binh Thien Village**

Bordering on Binh Ky village towards the sea is the village of Binh Thien. Two elderly Buddhist lay-leaders from An Cuong hamlet in Binh Thien told us that the Korean soldiers came to An Cuong hamlet in Binh Thien a few days after they had killed the civilians in Binh Ky. When the villagers saw the soldiers coming, they tried to run across into neighboring "secure," or Saigon-controlled, Van Tuong hamlet, also in Binh Thien, but most were turned back by American soldiers at the hamlet boundary. The two old men insisted that there had been no fighting that day, no contact between Koreans and guerrilla fighters, no NLF\* mines. Nonetheless, when the Koreans reached An Cuong, they rounded up a group of 60 people and shot and killed them all. Both of these old men had managed to escape into Van Tuong, but both lost several close relatives in the massacre.

### **Binh Duc Village**

Another eye-witness report of a massacre by Blue Dragon marines comes from Binh Duc village on the Batangan Peninsula not far from Binh Ky. Twenty-three-year-old Anh Tu from Phu Quy hamlet in Binh Duc told us the following:

"The first time I ever saw Korean soldiers was in about November 1966, when they came to my hamlet, Phu Quy. They belonged to the "Blue Dragon" Brigade and wore dragon insignia on their uniforms. They rounded up all the people they could find and made us stay in the hamlet schoolhouse for several hours. Then they passed out some milk powder and American rice and let us go, all except for a few who were arrested as "VC suspects." At that time we had plenty to eat and we didn't need any handouts from the Koreans.

"A few weeks later, we heard that the Koreans had murdered hundreds of people in Binh Ky village. After that, we began to hate and fear the Koreans. The guerrilla soldiers hated them bitterly and wore patches that read:

---

\* National Liberation Front, or "Viet Cong"

Xe Xac Rong Xanh — Tear the dead body of the Blue Dragon.

Phan Thay Manh Ho — Rip open the Tiger's corpse. (A reference to the Tiger Division, which operated in Binh Dinh Province, south of Quang Ngai.)

"Four months later, on March 24, 1967, the Koreans started a large operation in Binh Duc. On the first day, no troops were brought in, but there was artillery fire and bombing, including napalm, all day long. We all had good underground bunkers, so not many people were hurt.

"On the morning of the second day, March 25, the artillery and bombing continued. When it stopped helicopters full of Korean soldiers landed near Phu Quy. All the people in the hamlet were hiding in concealed bunkers. Most of the local guerrillas had left.

"When the Koreans came into the hamlet, they started looking around for the people. The crying of frightened children gave away the locations of several of the camouflaged bunkers. Whenever they found one, the Koreans used tear gas to force the people out. I can remember crouching in our bunker listening to the Vietnamese interpreter talking to some of the people captured. He told them not to be afraid, the Koreans were there to help them. The 20 or 30 people captured that day were held only a little while and then let loose, without being harmed.

"March 26, the next day, the Koreans returned again. My family hid again in our bunker but about 100 other people had decided it wasn't worth the trouble to hide all day, so they stayed above ground. Judging from what happened the day before, they did not think the Koreans would harm them.

"But as soon as the Blue Dragon soldiers arrived in our hamlet they started going from house to house, searching out people, killing anyone they found and burning the houses. Of the 100 people who were not in their bunkers, only a few managed to hide and were not found by the Koreans. The rest were all killed. I remember looking out the slit in our underground bunker and seeing the Korean soldiers walking by. I heard the people pleading with a Vietnamese interpreter to stop the Koreans from killing them. The Koreans called everyone "VC." They called the animals "VC" too and shot and killed all that they found, including about 500 cattle and a great number of pigs and chickens.

"We remained in our bunkers all the rest of that day. At night we climbed out, but didn't dare to bury the dead bodies because the Koreans were camped only about 100 meters away and would have seen our lights.

"The next day the Koreans came back again, but didn't find anyone. We stayed hidden underground all day long.

"By the following day, when the Koreans returned again by foot, the bodies were beginning to rot, as we still had not dared to bury them. Down in the bunkers the smell was not bad, but above ground it was terrible, and the Koreans all wore gas masks. They only stayed about an hour or so and didn't find anyone else. That day they left the area and returned to their base camp.



"The day after the Koreans left about two or three hundred Liberation soldiers came back and helped us bury the dead people and animals."

Two other accounts from Binh Duc village describe incidents in which 5 and 51 people were killed in Chau Binh and Chau Thuan hamlets several months before the March 1967 massacre in Phu Quy. The two women who told us these stories in separate interviews also told us that ROK Blue Dragon marines manned an outpost in Binh Duc village for the last four months of 1967. During that time, they said, there was much indiscriminate killing of civilians. Livestock was slaughtered, women were raped and killed, and dead bodies were thrown down wells. One of the women said the villagers figured that during the four months the Koreans killed over 1500 unarmed civilians in Binh Duc.

### **Binh An Village**

Nearby Binh An village was the site of at least two massacres of over 15 people, according to two other women. The women were from Phu Nhieu hamlet, located at the base of A Linh mountain, where Korean troops were stationed for several months in 1966 and 1967. The Koreans often came to Phu Nhieu on operations, said the women, and whenever they approached the villagers left their homes and ran away, sometimes for as long as 15 days at a time.

In one case, we were told, the Koreans found one person hiding in a rice field and started searching for others. They discovered a total of 35 people and shot them all. Another time, the Koreans found a tiny baby that had been left alone in a hammock when the family fled. Its mother was dead and the other relatives were afraid its crying would give away their hiding place. When the family returned, they found the child disembowelled.

When one of the women said such incidents were common, we asked her why the people didn't go live in a safer area. She replied that although they feared for their lives, Phu Nhieu was their only home and their ricefields were all that they owned. They had to stay there and harvest the rice. If they left, she said, what would they eat?

### **Quang Nam Province, Dien Ban District**

The Blue Dragons moved north from Quang Ngai to southern Quang Nam province on December 22, 1967. It was not long before they began to establish a reputation there similar to the one they had gained in Quang Ngai.

On February 12, 1968, two weeks after the Tet holiday, ROK marines killed a large number of civilians at Phong Nhi hamlet, Thanh Phong village, Dien Ban district. Unlike most of the massacres we were told of, this incident was widely known, at least in Quang Nam, and mention of it has been made in the western press. A **New York Times** article of February 13, 1972, reports that U. S. State Department and Marine Corps officials acknowledged the occurrence of this incident and said it had been brought to the attention of the Korean commander. A Marine Corps spokesman, however, was unable to state what reparative disciplinary action, if any, had been taken by the Koreans.

We met a group of eight people in a small refugee home in Phong Nhi hamlet in June 1972. They told us the incident occurred in the following way:

A detachment of Korean soldiers was on a daily road clearing operation on National Highway 1. A few hundred yards from Phong Nhi the patrol struck a land mine. The people in the hamlet said they heard the mine go off, but they heard no gunshots or any other sounds of fighting in the area. Shortly after the explosion Korean soldiers entered Phong Nhi, which was located next to the highway. They rounded up groups of villagers, took them to adjacent fields, and shot them; they shot other individuals in their homes; and they set fire to most of the hamlet.

One of the eight people who described the massacre for us was an old man who helped carry dead bodies, including that of his own grandchild, to the burial site. Another was a wrinkled old woman who lost two daughters and four grandchildren.

A university student we met in Saigon told us that he went to Phong Nhi from Hoi An, the nearest city, one or two days after the massacre. There he saw the naked bodies of small children who appeared to him to have been literally torn apart by people pulling on both legs.

A Buddhist nun from a nearby pagoda said that some of the bodies, including those of children, had been disembowelled with knives. "There were so many people killed," she recalled with tears in her eyes, "that our small pagoda didn't have enough incense to burn for all of them."

Phong Nhi hamlet was close to the highway and at the time was rated "secure" by the Saigon government. Among the victims were the wives and children of ARVN\* enlisted men and officers. Though the survivors sought a full investigation and government intervention in their behalf, nothing significant of the kind was carried out, they told us. The old woman said she received as compensation from the government 20 kilograms of rice and, for each of her six family members killed, two meters of mourning cloth.

Because of limitations of time and "security," we were unable to visit hamlets in Dien Ban district other than Phong Nhi. However, we heard several reports that Blue Dragon marines in Dien Ban were guilty of much brutality, especially during the first year they were stationed there.

For example, a young woman from Quang Nam told us she heard from survivors and on Liberation Radio\*\* about a massacre of 400 people in Dien Hong village near an American outpost called Don Bo Bo. She said that in late 1968 during the first Korean operation in the village area, the soldiers rounded up about 450 people, very few if any of whom were soldier-aged men. Then they shot into the crowd, killing all but 45, who somehow managed to escape. She said the rumor was that the Americans ordered the Koreans out of Dien Hong after this incident because they had killed so many civilians.

#### **Quang Nam Province, Duy Xuyen District, Xuyen Chau Village**

Duy Xuyen district in southeastern Quang Nam has been practically destroyed by the war and nearly all its people killed or made refugees. The South Korean Blue Dragons operated in Duy Xuyen from the beginning of 1968 until the end of 1971. In June 1972 as we rode on the back of a motor scooter west from National Highway 1 toward Xuyen Chau village, the driver motioned with his hand to the countryside. "This land all used to be pro-

---

\* Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Saigon troops.

\*\* Radio of the National Liberation Front



ductive fields lined with bamboo and fruit trees," he said. "There were two story tile-roofed houses everywhere." All we saw was a bumpy expanse of uncultivated grass and weeds. After bombing, artillery fire and military operations had driven the people away from their homes, our host told us, ROK units bulldozed flat this entire section of Duy Xuyen district. Several kilometers to the east Korean bulldozers buried under several feet of sand rice fields that were dug from the coastal sand dunes hundreds of years ago. Whole neighborhoods of houses were also scraped away after being bombed and shelled.

Not only farmland and homes have been destroyed in Duy Xuyen. A leading monk in the Quang Nam province Buddhist church told us that before 1965 there were over fifty pagodas in the district. There are only five left. We asked who was responsible for their destruction. "The Viet Cong don't have bombers and bulldozers," he said. Other villagers pointed out a broad field with a few new grave stones. "There used to be 4600 graves of our ancestors there," one of them said, "but the Koreans plowed them away when they set up one of their outposts. When they dug bunkers they turned up the bones of the dead. In this war you can't even rest in peace after you've been killed."

When we got to Xuyen Chau village that day we found the small pagoda crowded with people beginning a two-day annual ceremony to pray for the souls of the dead. Hundreds of strips of paper were arranged on several tables around the altar. On each paper was written the name and date of death of one person. One of the monks invited us to come in and "pray for those killed by the Americans and Koreans."

Later we sat down with a group of old men in another part of the pagoda and asked them to tell us what Korean troops had done in their village. They said that on February 29, 1968, Korean soldiers killed about 40 civilians, mostly women and children, in Xuyen Tay hamlet. Then the old men called in survivors of the incident. They came forward one by one and told us what happened to their families.

Most of the victims, they said, had still been hiding after an artillery barrage when the Koreans came on foot into the hamlet and started throwing grenades into their bunkers. One woman survived the blast in her bunker which killed her sister and two nieces. Seven of another woman's relatives, two parents and their five children, were killed in their bunker. A man told us his wife, daughter and three grandchildren were similarly killed. One young man said his uncle and two other people were shot and their bodies thrown in a well. After we heard nine such stories accounting for 33 deaths, the group of old men added up other victims whom they knew and determined that 62, not 40 as they estimated earlier, had been killed in Xuyen Tay that day. Different people told us again and again that there had been no fighting that day or any other time in Xuyen Tay. They said the hamlet was rated "secure" by the Saigon government.

The above incident was the largest that occurred in Xuyen Tay, the people said, but there were many scattered cases of killing, robbery and rape by the South Koreans. We were told that farmers in Xuyen Tay usually carried large sums of money with them when they went to work in the fields because they were afraid to leave it in their unguarded homes. They related to us several specific cases of Korean soldiers killing men and robbing them of very large sums. The people also said that while Koreans were stationed nearby eighteen women disappeared at different times from their homes and fields and were presumed raped



and killed. One man told us with much emotion that on March 15, 1969, he was at home with his family when they saw Korean soldiers approaching. He and his children ran to hide and his wife stayed behind to watch the house. After the soldiers left, he and the children came back to find that she had been blindfolded, raped, thrown into the bunker and killed with a grenade.

Villagers told us that in other parts of Xuyen Chau village many people were killed in separate incidents. For example, on January 29, 1968, two old men and two children were in their home 300 meters off the highway eating lunch. A few Korean soldiers "looking for girls" came to their house from the road. They found the four people and shot them.

Such actions by the Koreans were common for the first year and a half they were stationed near Xuyen Chau, we learned, but decreased after 1969 as they stayed inside their bases more and went on fewer operations. In fact, the Quang Nam Province Chief, Col. Le Tri Tin, told Associated Press reporter Michael Putzel in early 1970 that because the ROK troops had too often killed civilians, they had been largely removed from combat duty that was likely to bring them into contact with noncombatant Vietnamese people.

Just before the Blue Dragons were to leave Duy Xuyen district (and Vietnam), one of them came to Xuyen Chau village with forms on which he asked the local people to write down the good things their South Korean allies had done for them. The old men in the pagoda laughed as they said none of them, nor anyone they knew, filled out the forms. They had nothing good to write down about the Koreans, they told us, and didn't dare write anything bad.

### **Xuyen Hiep Village**

People in another "secure" hamlet told us about a time when ROK soldiers came. A "Company 5" of the Blue Dragon Brigade had an outpost on low ground near Kieu Son hamlet in Xuyen Hiep village, just west of Xuyen Chau. When flood water inundated the post on October 19, 1968, the Koreans moved up and occupied the small pagoda in Kieu Son. The first night passed uneventfully, but the second night guerrillas staged a small rocket attack on the pagoda from about 10 to 11 o'clock. In response the Koreans shot outward at random from their position all night, the villagers said.

The next morning the soldiers took action against the nearest people. They burned the small house of the elderly couple who watched over the pagoda and killed them both. All the houses near the pagoda were also burned, and the villagers gave us a list of 12 names of people who were killed in their homes or as they fled. In addition to the 12, all 10 members of one family were killed by grenades thrown into their bunker. Throughout the morning the Koreans rounded up all the other Kieu Son villagers they could find, about 200-300 people, and led them to a swamp, where they forced them to kneel down so that the water was up around their necks. They all expected to be shot, but a Vietnamese-Korean interpreter, other Vietnamese soldiers and local government officials intervened in time and got them all released.

The incident in Kieu Son was one of the few cases we heard about in which victims of Korean operations were given compensation. The Saigon government gave survivors 4000 piastres (about US \$20) for each adult family member killed and 2000 piastres for each child.



### **Xuyen Truong Village**

During the Tet offensive of 1968 Blue Dragon Marines from "Company 6" were sent to man an outpost on Hong Bang hill in Xuyen Truong village a few kilometers northwest of Kieu Son. In the years while they were stationed there, villagers told us, the Korean soldiers killed about 300 civilians in many scattered incidents. During the course of our conversation in Xuyen Truong we asked an old man what the people there feared most. "First," he said, "American bombs and shells — they have killed about 400 villagers. And second, the Koreans." "Are the people afraid of the Liberation Front?" we asked. "No," he replied emphatically.

Dong Yen hamlet was the site of the largest single incident of South Korean brutality in Xuyen Truong village. The six people who told us they had friends and relatives killed there on June 8, 1968, insisted that on that day not a single shot was fired at the ROK troops; if there were any guerrilla fighters in the hamlet area, they had hidden or departed. Yet the Koreans, who had come into the hamlet on an operation, burned most of the houses and killed 36 people. The only survivors in the affected area were two small boys who happened to be hiding in one end of an S-shaped bunker when soldiers threw grenades into the other end, killing all the rest of their family.

Other people related to us several scattered incidents which occurred on different days in Dong Yen and nearby Chim Son hamlet. Once in the latter place, we were told, the Blue Dragons beheaded villagers and put their heads on poles stuck in the ground. When we mentioned this later to another person from Quang Nam, he responded, "Oh yes, that's quite common. It's a specialty of the South Korean troops."

### **Xuyen Tan and Xuyen Thai Villages**

The earliest massacres of civilians by ROK soldiers in Duy Xuyen district that we were told about occurred in Xuyen Tan and Xuyen Thai villages, just east of National Highway 1. On January 19, 1968, ten days before the famous Tet holiday, Koreans came to Xuyen Tan for the first time. Near a pond called Bao Van Quat they rounded up 48 people, nearly all women and children, forced them to stand in a line, and shot them all. After this, a group of Xuyen Tan men told us, all the people in the village were moved from or fled their homes, and the village's four prosperous hamlets were reduced to a cluster of shacks along the highway. The men in Xuyen Tan thought the Koreans were most brutal early in their occupation of the area "probably because they wanted to make all the people afraid of them," and thereby make it safer for themselves.

At the quiet and desolate Xuyen Thai "Return-to-Village" camp a kilometer off of National Highway 1 we met a few old men who gave us accounts of their experiences with Korean soldiers on operation. They said that just before Tet 1968 Koreans came to Trieu Chau hamlet in Xuyen Thai. On the first day of their operation they rounded up twenty people: six children, three old men and eleven women. They led them off to a cemetery where they killed some of them on that day and the rest the next day. We were shown a list of the twenty names. About the same time in Trieu Chau, the men said, all seven members of the family of Mr. Le Quang were killed when Korean troops fired a grenade launcher or bazooka into their bunker.



Then on the first day of Tet 22 people, including 13 women and several children, decided to leave their homes in Ha Nhuan hamlet, also part of Xuyen Thai village. They had heard of the killings in nearby Trieu Chau, and though Ha Nhuan was rated "secure," they hoped to find greater security near the highway. They took all the possessions they could carry and were leading their cows and water buffaloes. South Korean soldiers saw them hurrying along the road, stopped them, lined them up in a line, and shot them down with machine guns. They left their bodies lying where they fell. After that Xuyen Thai, like Xuyen Tan, was completely deserted.

### **Xuyen Phuoc Village**

In June 1972 Xuyen Phuoc "Return-to-Village" camp consisted of several rows of tin and plank houses surrounded by barbed wire set on a hot barren stretch of beach in eastern Duy Xuyen district. When we visited there we hoped again to meet a group of villagers who could tell us about Korean activities in their area. On our arrival at the camp, however, the Saigon government's Assistant Village Chief was called to meet us, and he did most of the talking while we were there. At first he said that the South Koreans had not really harmed the people much. This statement was greeted by exclamations of contradiction from the few adult villagers present. So with considerable prodding and frequent corrections and additions from the others, he began to tell us about the first time the Blue Dragons came to Xuyen Phuoc from their base in Cam Hai, across the river to the north. On January 17, 1968, two days before Tet, Korean troops passed the first two largely evacuated hamlets Thon Mot (Hamlet 1) and Thon Hai (Hamlet 2). In Thon Ba (Hamlet 3) they found Mr. Dang Sa at the small altar in front of his house making an end-of-the-year offering. When they started taking him away the eleven members of his family came out of the house to plead for his release. All of them were shot where they stood. Other villagers hid in their bunkers and were not harmed that day. Then the Koreans moved on to Thon Tu (Hamlet 4) and killed a few more people before calling a village meeting to urge the people to trust them as their Allies and not follow the Viet Cong.

The single worst massacre we heard about in Xuyen Phuoc — again the Assistant Village Chief did most of the talking — took place in Thon Nam (Hamlet 5) in the latter part of 1968. No one present could remember the exact date. At that time the four hamlets to the north had been largely evacuated, but about 500 people still lived in Hamlet 5. When they heard the armored vehicles of the Blue Dragons approaching, most of the people ran out of the village area and hid in the brush and trees on the adjacent hills. Fifty-one people, though, were unable to run because of age or poor health. Several pregnant women were among them. These people gathered together "to keep their spirits up" and sat in front of a home in the village, making no attempt to hide. They thought that way the soldiers on operation would not mistake them as enemy soldiers or consider them any kind of threat. But when the Koreans arrived they fired into the crowd with machine guns, killing everyone. In three or four days when the operation was over the other villagers ventured back from their hiding places, found the bodies and buried them.

The Assistant Village Chief told us this was the only such large incident he could remember. Then he explained that later, after the people had been cleared out of all five hamlets in Xuyen Phuoc, the hamlet sites and much of the farmland were plowed level by South Koreans on bulldozers. He estimated that 4000 of Xuyen Phuoc's original 15,000 people



have been killed in the war — 2000 by bombs and artillery and 2000 by the armies which came into the village. When we asked him which armies, he mentioned only the Americans and Koreans. We asked him if the Viet Cong ever killed the people. "Of course they did," he said. "They killed some of those who went to work for the government."

"Did the Viet Cong ever engage the Koreans in battle?" we asked. "No, they never shot at the Koreans because they knew the Koreans would take revenge against the people . . . The Koreans were poor fighters. They never really went out and fought the Viet Cong, but just killed the peasant people and the livestock, which they called 'VC.'"

After our visit to Xuyen Phuoc we returned to Hoi An city, provincial capital of Quang Nam, where we happened to meet Ong Muoi, a church leader from Xuyen Phuoc. He said he wished he had known of our intentions earlier since he could have helped us get information on Korean actions in his village. We asked if he could give us the exact date of the massacre of 50 people in Hamlet 5. "Fifty?" he said. "There were over 200 in three or four different incidents."

When we were able to meet Ong Muoi some time later, he said he had visited surviving relatives of victims of four massacres. He handed us a piece of paper on which he had written the date, place and number of people killed in each one. Unfortunately our conversation with him was interrupted before we were able to ask him for much further information about the massacres.

Here is a brief account of the information he gave us. He said the four incidents occurred in 1970, but other sources indicate it is possible that some or all of them took place in 1969. (As mentioned above, we often encountered uncertainty as to which year a given event happened.)

According to Ong Muoi:

On February 8 in Hamlet 4, ROK troops on operations captured a total of 86 people, including old men, women and children. They herded them all into the yard in front of Mr. Le Huong's house. They then killed them all with explosives.

On March 22 in Hamlet 5, South Korean soldiers found 64 people hiding in several different bunkers, again mostly women and children, forced them into a single group near the home of Mr. Nguyen Lieu, and killed them all with explosives.

In Hamlet 4 on July 20 the Koreans discovered 47 people hiding in a single huge bunker and without calling them to come out, killed them all by throwing in explosives.

On November 3 in Hamlet 5, Korean troops shot 53 people in front of Mr. Vo Duan's house. This is likely the same incident the people and Assistant Village Chief in Xuyen Phuoc camp told us about, but circumstances prevented us from asking enough questions of Ong Muoi to verify it.

### **Xuyen Tho Village**

Xuyen Tho, the last of the eight villages we visited in Duy Xuyen district, is immediately inland from Xuyen Phuoc. As in Xuyen Phuoc, the only villagers in Xuyen Tho were living

in a recently-established Return-to-Village camp. The surrounding land, which was once productive fields, was an expanse of sand and weeds, with only a few remade fields beginning to produce some sweet potatoes. Visiting Xuyen Tho one hot afternoon, we spoke with a large group of villagers outside the tiny wooden shack that served as the camp pagoda. Person after person, they recounted the stories of incidents that had occurred, affecting friends and relatives, when ROK troops came into the area. When it became obvious that we wouldn't have time to hear everybody's story, the villagers began writing down brief statements on scraps of paper and passing them up to us. By the time we left, we had received 65 papers in all, most of them including the date, place, the number and often names of persons killed. The total number of victims listed on all 65 papers was 239. Of those specified as to age and/or sex, there were 11 old men, 44 younger men, 42 women, and 53 children.

Xuyen Tho people told us about two larger massacres in their village, both of which occurred near Le Son hamlet. In December 1968 and January 1969 many people from Le Son fled to "insecure" Binh Duong village in adjacent Quang Tin province to seek refuge from Korean operations then being conducted in Xuyen Tho. On the fourth day of the Tet holiday, February, 1969, 34 people decided to walk back to Le Son to make new year's offerings at their home sites. The older sister and niece of the woman who related this story to us were among them. The people in the group carried no weapons; only four of them were men; all of them were dressed in their traditional holiday clothes. Along the way they were stopped by Korean soldiers and forcibly marched two kilometers to a large sand dune, where they were all shot. The next day the soldiers brought a bulldozer and pushed their bodies into a bomb crater.

Two and a half months later, on April 6, 1969, ROK troops on operation from a temporary outpost in Thuan An hamlet, Xuyen Tho, captured 74 people in Le Son and led them to a dry pond near a tall sand dune called Nong Ong Thoang. Here they killed them all and pushed the bodies into a bomb crater with a bulldozer and covered them. The soldiers stayed in the area for six or seven days. When they finally left and relatives returned to find the bodies, there was no way to drag them out of the crater and bury them decently. The woman who gave us this account, which was verified by two or three other people present, insisted that there was no fighting in the area at that time, "not a single shot fired" at the Koreans. She lost a child who had gone out to dig sweet potatoes that day.

Some old men of Xuyen Tho told us that in the early 1960's there were about 8000 people living in the village, but that there were only 4000 left in June 1972. Of the 1000-2000 killed in the war, they figured, 600-700 were killed by the Koreans. A captain in the RVN police force there told us that only about 20 percent of the people in Xuyen Tho Return-to-Village camp supported the Saigon government.

#### **Quang Tin Province, Thang Binh District, Binh Duong Village**

Toward the end of 1969, Korean soldiers stationed in Quang Nam near Hoi An were used in large clearing operations just south of the provincial border in Binh Duong village, Quang Tin province. Until 1969 Binh Duong was under virtually complete National Liberation Front control. N.L.F. cadres lived there among the people and the children attended N.L.F. schools. Starting in 1964 Binh Duong was heavily shelled by Allied artillery. From 1967 through 1969, American and ARVN forces made forays into the village, but had little



success in "pacifying" it. Finally, in the latter half of 1969 joint American-ROK sweeps of the area were conducted in order to move the population out and destroy the N.L.F.'s hold on the land. Although these were joint operations, the villagers we talked to mentioned only Korean troops as actually coming into their villages, and all the incidents we heard about were attributed to Koreans.

In a barren white sand refugee camp along Highway 1, we talked to Ong Tam, a member of the Binh Duong Village Council, the local level of the Saigon government. Though a number of other refugees crowded the house where we were sitting, none of them offered any comments; they let the government man speak. He started by telling us that the people of Binh Duong have suffered much in the war. Out of a population of 11,700 in 1964, 3000 have been killed, he estimated, 4000 went to join the communists, 2000 are still in refugee settlements along Highway 1 and 2000 have now returned to Binh Duong itself to live in the government Return-to-Village camp.

In 1969, Ong Tam said, "the Allies called Koreans" conducted two operations into "VC" controlled Binh Duong which finally succeeded in pacifying it. The first operation began on November 12, 1969, following a night bombing raid on the village. In the morning, Koreans came from Cam Ha, near Hoi An, in helicopters. Soon after they landed, they encountered "light resistance" from local guerrillas and also some land mines; a few Koreans were killed. People who had time to escape ran either west to the National Highway or south to the Saigon government-secured village of Binh Dao. Others hid in bunkers.

About 9 a.m. in Hoa Yen hamlet the Koreans gathered together 113 people and shot them all. They were women, children and old men — the people who "couldn't run" because of age or infirmity. All the young men had fled by then.

Later the same day in Bau Binh hamlet, approximately 100 more people were rounded up and killed by the Korean soldiers, according to Ong Tam. He said the villagers were not sure of the exact number because the bodies had been scattered about and many had been pushed into bomb craters or plowed under in the subsequent Korean bulldozing operations.

Besides the two large groups, a great number of individuals were killed in scattered incidents, Ong Tam told us. He estimated that a total of about 300 civilians — mostly women, children and old men — were killed by Koreans in Binh Duong that day.

Late in the following January, according to an Associated Press story of January 31, 1970, the N.L.F. delegation to the Paris peace talks charged that 240 civilians, most of them old people, were killed by allied troops in Binh Duong village on November 12, 1969, the same date which Ong Tam gave us.

As the two-week long operation progressed, most of the villagers left Binh Duong. The N.L.F. regular troops and local guerrillas were also afraid of the Koreans, Ong Tam said, and they left Binh Duong along with the people. Trying to explain the Koreans' actions, Ong Tam told us that since the guerrillas fled together with the people, the Koreans mistook the people for Viet Cong and killed them. We asked how he thought the Koreans could mistake groups of unarmed women, old men and children for guerrillas. He thought a moment and said, "The ones that were killed were not guerrillas, not any of them."

After the initial attack, the Koreans brought in bulldozers and cleared much of the land, scraping away houses, trees and underground bunkers. After 15 days, the operation was over



and the people, along with the guerrillas, could return home and bury their dead.

Since the first operation did not succeed in "pacifying" Binh Duong, a second one was mounted in the last lunar month of 1969 (January-February 1970). On the first day, the South Koreans again came in helicopters and met light resistance from the Viet Cong. However, according to Ong Tam, all the guerrillas soon ran away and the Koreans found only women and children.

At one market place, Cho Moi Lac Cau, a number of people from Dong Thanh and Hoa Yen hamlets had gathered and were hiding in bunkers in nearby houses when the Koreans arrived. The soldiers found 75 people near the market and killed them with machine guns and hand grenades. On the same day they also killed a large number of people in scattered small incidents. Although after the initial landing the Koreans met no resistance, Ong Tam said, they shot at anyone they saw.

Ong Tam estimated that as a result of the two operations there were approximately 700 civilians known dead, their bodies found, and an additional 200 missing, most of those presumed dead and buried in bomb craters or plowed under in bunkers. During the month-long second operation most of the village was levelled by bulldozers, particularly Dong Thanh, Nam Binh, and Hoa Yen hamlets.

We asked Ong Tam's opinion on the fighting ability of the ROK soldiers. "With regard to tactics and strategy," he said, "they are no better and no worse than the ARVN." They could succeed in pacifying a place like Binh Duong, he went on, because the Viet Cong knew the Korean policy of taking revenge on civilians whenever they encountered guerrillas in a given area. "The Koreans had only to hear one shot ring out and the nearest hamlet would lose 90 people," he told us.

A man from Bau Binh hamlet, Binh Duong, 25 year old Anh Ba, told us what happened to his family during these operations.

"Korean soldiers came into Binh Duong several times," he said, "each time for about 10-15 days. Every time we saw the helicopters approaching, we left our homes and ran south across a wide stretch of sand to Binh Dao village, which the Saigon government called 'secure.' On February 2, 1970," (a date which corresponds to the time Ong Tam gave us for the second of the two operations) "we saw some helicopters approaching and started running. I was lucky enough to make it to safety, but when I dared to look back I saw my father, who was 70 years old, and my four brothers and sisters were cut off by the Koreans when their helicopters landed between Bau Binh and Binh Dao. They took my family and about 50 other villagers back to the hamlet and then down to the beach. They lined them up at the edge of a bomb crater and shot them all. We who had escaped to Binh Dao didn't dare return home for another seven or eight days, as long as the Korean troops remained in the area. By the time we got back and found the bodies in the bomb crater, they had decomposed quite a lot, but we pulled them out and gave them proper burials."

Several weeks after the final allied operation, a lower house deputy from Danang, Mr. Phan Xuan Huy, reported to the Quang Tin Province Chief stories he had heard from refugees from Binh Duong about killings of innocent civilians by South Korean soldiers. Apparently because of Mr. Huy's interest and the possibility of his publicizing these stories in Saigon,



the Province Chief decided to organize an investigation. He helicoptered out to Binh Duong with a number of government officials and a military escort. They questioned the villagers and even went so far as to dig up some of the bodies which had been buried in mass graves.

The investigation, however, produced no positive results as far as either Mr. Huy or the people of Binh Duong could see. Families never received any compensation from the government and they heard nothing more about the investigation. Ong Tam, the Village Councilman, said the government made the investigation only "because of political reasons, not to accomplish anything for the villagers."

### **Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces**

All of the accounts presented above were told to us by villagers from Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam provinces, where the Blue Dragon Marine Brigade was active from mid-1966 through 1971. In the course of our investigation, we often heard people say that the "Tiger" Division, stationed in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces, was as bad as the Blue Dragon in its treatment of the civilian population. A Rand Corporation report\* from December 1966 gives strong evidence that Korean troops killed large numbers of civilians prior to that time in both Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces. The report contains in interview form descriptions of two large massacres in Phu Yen and one in Binh Dinh, plus a number of smaller incidents and second-hand reports of South Korean brutality.

Although we were unable to do extensive research in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen, we spent a few days in July 1972 talking with people in Binh Dinh. As in Quang Ngai, Quang Tin and Quang Nam, the military situation in Binh Dinh at the time limited our travel and we had to be content with talking to a few refugees near Highway 1. During one morning and one afternoon, we heard stories of five different massacres with a total of 165 people killed by the soldiers of the Tiger Division. All but one of the incidents dated from 1965 and 1966. The people we met stated that such incidents had been very common during the first years the Koreans were in Binh Dinh, but slackened in recent years since the Tigers mostly stayed on their bases and were not used in operations in populated zones. One young man told us that there had been at least one incident in every hamlet in his village, Cat Thang in Phu Cat district. One morning in his hamlet of Hoi Loc, he said, airplanes dropped leaflets warning that the area would soon be bombed. Sixty or seventy people decided to flee carrying all the belongings they could. The group, which included entire families, was stopped on the road by an ROK patrol. They were lined up and shot, all except for two or three who managed to escape and tell the story later.

The most recent report of a massacre by Korean troops comes from Phu Yen province. As reported in the Washington Post of September 10, 1972, evidence indicates that Korean soldiers killed over 20 civilians in Phu Long hamlet, Xuan Son village, on July 26 and 31, 1972. Most of the victims were either under 12 or over 60 years old. According to the villagers' accounts the Koreans lost some men to sniper fire near Phu Long and responded by shooting people they caught in the hamlet. Official Saigon and Korean sources claimed that

---

\*Published in June, 1972, by Alternative Features Service, Berkeley, California.

the villagers' story was untrue.

### Summary and Comments

In all we heard from local sources reports of more than 45 specific incidents in which ROK soldiers were said to have killed groups of over 20 unarmed civilians. In 13 of the cases over 100 civilians were reported killed. The accounts which we felt were most clearly and coherently related or verified by more than one person were included in this article. Besides these 45 incidents we were told of many more scattered cases of killing, robbery and rape committed by South Koreans.

Because of the very large number of reported massacres, we feel it would be unrealistic to describe them all as mistakes or exceptional cases of misbehavior by individual South Korean soldiers. In some cases the ROK troops had just lost men to guerrilla sniper fire or mines and therefore were probably acting in anger. Yet in the majority of cases, the people told us that as far as they knew there was no fighting nearby on the days of the massacres, "not the shot of a single gun," no mines, no Korean casualties.

In almost every case we were told that most of the victims were women, old people, and children. The men were most often working in the fields or hiding.

Furthermore several other aspects of the massacres show a consistency one would not expect in a series of unrelated accidents or mistakes. The recurrence of particular details in the reports we heard suggests that the ROK forces employed tactics of deliberate brutality to deal with the noncombatant rural population in their areas of operation.

In most of the large massacres the people were not killed until they were rounded up into groups, and then often they were forced to line up. In four different accounts from Quang Ngai Korean soldiers were said to have passed out candy and cigarettes to the people, especially the children, before killing them. The only explanation we found for this practice was to reduce the people's fear and entice them out into the open. Four different times large numbers of victims' bodies were dumped into bomb craters, and several times attempts were made to hide the bodies in other ways, such as throwing them into water or covering them with leaves or rice stalks and dirt. At least six times we were told that groups of victims were forced to march a considerable distance from the place they were captured to the place they were killed. We heard about numerous occurrences of atrocities such as throwing dead bodies into wells, beheading, disembowelling, and rape ending in murder. Many of these disembowelled or raped were said to have been pregnant women.

Self-protection was the explanation most often given by Vietnamese for this apparent policy of brutality. In several areas people told us that the guerrilla forces seldom fired upon or engaged Korean troops, because they knew that if they did the people would suffer the Koreans' revenge. A discharged ARVN soldier from Binh Dinh told us that for this reason an ROK patrol could pass unchallenged through an area where an ARVN patrol would be sniped at or attacked. It is interesting to note that a Korean press information bulletin claims captured enemy documents reveal that N.L.F. soldiers feared contact with Korean soldiers and had orders to avoid them.

Many times people expressed to us the opinion that the widespread killing by ROK troops was more the fault of the Americans than the Koreans. As Americans, we were the



subject of much mistrust. "Why are you asking about the misdeeds of the Koreans and not those of your own government's troops?" the villagers asked us. "Who brought the Koreans here anyway? Who pays their salaries?"

Despite the fact that the Saigon government refers to the South Koreans as Allies in the fight against communist aggression, the Vietnamese peasants that we talked to see them as "rented soldiers" or mercenaries of the Americans. Vietnamese people often told us that many Koreans came to Vietnam because of the economic advantages: much higher salaries than they could get in Korea, Post Exchange privileges, black market and other opportunities to share in the widespread corruption, huge cost-free baggage allowances on return to Korea, and so forth. Since they only come over here to make money, people asked, why should they concern themselves with the welfare of the Vietnamese people, or anything at all other than their own self-preservation?

"Korean mercenaries," one young woman from Quang Nam explained to us, "have no ideology. They get paid a lot of money by the Americans to come to Viet Nam and kill people, and the more people they can kill, the more money they will get. That is the basic nature of mercenaries."

Two well-educated people, one of them strongly anti-communist, extended the logic. They said that when the Americans gave South Vietnamese soldiers bonus pay and sent them into Cambodia, they behaved as the Koreans did in Vietnam.

People also thought the Americans as tactical commanders were responsible for Korean brutality. Many felt that the Koreans were ordered by Americans to pacify "insecure" areas in which they were told all the people were "VC." As the Koreans usually did not have interpreters with them when they went out on operations, they had no way to communicate with the people. Consequently, the explanation was, they often carried out their orders to pacify by indiscriminately killing all those they came upon.

One woman from Binh Duc village, Quang Ngai, told about a Korean captain who addressed a crowd of people rounded up during a large sweep of her home village in 1968. He spoke Vietnamese and, according to the woman, told the crowd that when he first came to Vietnam, the Americans advised him and the other Koreans that all the people in certain areas were "VC." As a result, some unfortunate mistakes had been made. He said that after he had been in Vietnam for some time, however, he had learned that what the Americans said wasn't true, and therefore he had ordered his men not to hurt the people.

Some people felt that the U.S. profited in indirect ways from the South Korean presence. One Buddhist monk advanced the theory that the Americans deliberately used the Koreans "to make the Americans look good." Since the Koreans acted so brutally, the Americans by comparison would look better to the people. As the Americans are the real conductors of this war, the monk continued, they have to worry about their image as well as military strategy.

Indeed almost everybody we asked said that when the South Koreans went on ground operations, they were worse than the Americans. However, as we were reminded by the Vietnamese people we interviewed, American shelling and bombing of the countryside resulted in far more death and destruction than could ever have been accomplished by ground troops.

The use of foreign armies to do the fighting on the ground is a practice which the U.S. government developed and implemented extensively in the Indochina war. The South Koreans in Vietnam served a dual purpose, both giving the impression of a unified Allied effort and providing some military assistance. The unpublicized employment of local and tribal forces on the ground in Laos and Cambodia has helped the U.S. cover up a war that would no doubt be unpopular at home if American ground troops were involved in large numbers. When public opinion forced a reduction in the involvement of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, the American government increased its efforts to build up a South Vietnamese army which it hoped would be able to carry on the ground war and help save American interests in Vietnam.

With the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973, the South Korean troops were withdrawn from South Vietnam along with the American GI's. America's use of foreign soldiers, however, did not stop. Now it is the winter of 1975 and Vietnamese and Cambodian armies, supplied with vast amounts of American advice, military hardware, and money, are still fighting for America's elusive victory.



## REPORTED MASSACRES BY SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS

## QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

## BINH SON DISTRICT

<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
Phu Nhieu	Binh An	March 1967 or later.	35 people hiding in a rice field were discovered and shot.	A*. Resident of hamlet who fled when Koreans came.
Phu Nhieu	Binh An	Early 1967	30 women and children who stayed behind to watch their homes while the rest of the hamlet fled were killed.	A. Resident of hamlet who fled, then returned later and saw dead bodies.
Phu Quy	Binh Duc	26/3/67	About 100 people, mostly families with small children were killed in their homes.	A. Eye-witness who watched from concealed bunker as Koreans killed villagers.
Chau Thuan	Binh Duc	9/10/66	51 people, many of whom were forced into a large bunker, were killed by explosives and gunfire.	B. Resident of Chau Thuan, not present at the time.
An Phuoc	Binh Ky	6/12/66	200 people were shot in three separate groups.	A. Resident of hamlet who heard shooting, returned same day and buried bodies.
Long Binh	Binh Ky	6/12/66	30 people were led to the top of a hill and shot, their bodies thrown in a bomb crater.	A. Resident of hamlet who hid when Koreans came, returned later and found relatives in mass grave.
Lac Son (Xom Cau neighborhood)	Binh Ky	6/12/66	From 150 to 450 people killed in one large group. Bodies were blown up with mines afterward.	A. Smaller estimate: two Xom Cau residents who fled when Koreans came. Larger estimate and Tan An report: Eye-witness who watched killings at Xom Cau and helped bury bodies.
Lac Son	Binh Ky	6/12/66	100-150 people killed in one group.	
An Cuong	Binh Thien	following Binh Ky massacre.	60 people were rounded up and shot.	A. Two hamlet residents who fled when Koreans came. Both lost relatives in massacre.
Thach An	Binh Tuyen	Early 1967	Over 30 people, hands tied behind backs, were led to top of a hill and shot.	A. Resident of Thach An who fled when Koreans came, returned to help bury bodies.
?	Binh Hoang	Early 1967	Well over 30 people from two hamlets were killed in a rice field.	B. Same resident of Thach An who heard reports of nearby Binh Hoang massacre.

\* "A" indicates personal and direct knowledge of the event, someone who was in the village at the time of the massacre, witnessed the actual killings, or saw the Koreans and heard the shooting, or returned to help bury the bodies of the victims. "B" indicates indirect knowledge of the event, someone who heard reports of the massacre from villagers at a later time.

## QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

## SON TINH DISTRICT

<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
Dien Nien	Son Loc	12/11/66	50-100 people were rounded up and shot after Koreans passed out candy and cigarettes. 120 also estimated.	A. Village resident who was questioned by Koreans in Dien Nien but escaped. 120 given by group below.
Phuoc Binh	Son Loc	11/11/66	140 people were killed in their homes. Koreans passed out candy first.	A. Resident of hamlet who was released by Koreans just before the massacre.
Vinh Loc	Son Chau	13/11/66	40 people out working in the were led away 5 km. and shot.	B. Group of refugees from Son Loc - Son Chau area who heard reports of massacres from other villagers.
?	Son Chau & Son Loc	December 1966	200 people from these villages were led to a place near Phuoc Binh hamlet and shot.	
Khuong Loc	?	30/9/66	40 people were grouped together, led to a bomb crater and shot, their bodies pushed into the crater.	
Ha Tay	Son Trung	1966	34 people lined up and shot after 2 Koreans were killed by snipers.	B. Local resident who heard report later.
An Tinh & Khanh Van	Son Hoa	August-Sept. 1967	30 people found hiding in bunkers after an artillery barrage were killed.	B. Village resident who was away at the time, heard reports later.
An Binh & Dong Nhon	Son Dong	Late 1966	46 people, including in a Cao Dai temple, were killed as Koreans went from house to house.	A. Resident of An Binh who was in the hamlet at the time, heard the shooting, fled, and returned later, finding dead bodies and burnt houses.
Minh Trung	Son Nam	Late 1966	About 30 people were killed.	B. Nearby resident left Minh Trung shortly before massacre and heard reports later.
Binh Bac	Son Tra	October-Nov. 1966	200-300 people were killed in their homes.	B. Resident of Son Tra heard reports.
?	Son Kim	Uncertain	About 100 people were gathered in a rice field and shot.	B. Young resident of Son Kim who said he was in the area at the time.

## QUANG NAM PROVINCE

## DIEN BAN DISTRICT

?	Dien Hong	December 1968	400 people, almost an entire hamlet, were killed.	B. Person who heard reports on NLF radio and later spoke with Dien Hong villagers.
Phong Nhi	Thanh Phong	12/2/68	130 people killed after Koreans struck a mine while on a road-clearing operation. Victims included families of ARVN soldiers.	A. A number of Thanh Phong residents, some of whom were nearby on the day of the massacre and heard the shots, some of whom lost relatives that day and helled bury the bodies.



## QUANG TIN PROVINCE

## THANG BINH DISTRICT

<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
Hoa Yen	Binh Duong	12/11/69	113 people, all women, children and old men who didn't run away in time when Korean troops came on an operation, were killed.	
Bau Binh	Binh Duong	12/11/69	About 100 people were killed	B. (?). A member of the Binh Duong village council and several villagers.
Dong Thanh & Hoa Yen	Binh Duong	January or Feb. 1970	75 people were found at a market place and killed.	
Bau Binh	Binh Duong	2/2/70	50 people were led to a bomb crater near the ocean and killed.	A. A resident of Binh Duong who saw his family led away by Korean soldiers and later found their bodies in a mass grave.

## BINH DINH PROVINCE

## PHU CAT DISTRICT

<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
Hoi Loc	Cat Thang	Early 1966	60-70 people killed on the road after planes dropped leaflets warning them to leave their village.	A. Resident of Hoi Loc who was in the hamlet at the time.
Tan Xuan & Khanh Phuoc	Cat Hanh	30/12/65	32 villagers killed after 2 Korean soldiers had been killed by sniper fire.	A. Village councilman from Cat Hanh who helped bury the dead.

## AN NHON DISTRICT

<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
Kim Tai	Nhon Phong	1966	About 30 people were forced into a schoolhouse which was then burned to the ground. One old man and one young boy survived.	B. According to report from Nhon Phong Pagoda and one villager, on separate occasions.

## QUANG NAM PROVINCE

## DUY XUYEN DISTRICT

<u>Hamlet</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
Xuyen Tay	Xuyen Chau	29/2/68	62 people were killed while hiding in bunkers after artillery barrage. Hamlet was near Korean outpost and rated "secure."	A. A number of people from Xuyen Tay, many of whom lost relatives in massacre, some of whom were in hamlet at the time and survived.
Kieu Son	Xuyen Hiep	20/10/68	22 people were killed in their homes following an NLF mortar attack on a nearby Korean outpost.	A. A number of hamlet residents who were there on the day of the massacre.
Dong Yen & Chim Son	Xuyen Truong	8/6/68	36 people killed in their homes. A total of over 300 villagers were killed by Koreans over 2 yrs.	A. A group of villagers at Xuyen Truong refugee camp.
Trieu Chau	Xuyen Thai	Just before Tet 1968	20 people were captured, led to a cemetery and killed.	A. A small group of residents at Xuyen Thai refugee camp.
Trieu Chau	Xuyen Thai	First day of Tet 1968 (30/1/68)	22 people leaving the hamlet for a safer area were killed on the road.	
Van Quat	Xuyen Tan	19/1/68	48 people, nearly all women and children, were rounded up and shot near a pond.	A. A number of residents at Xuyen Tan refugee camp.
Hamlet 5	Xuyen Phuoc	Late 1968	51 old and infirm people, including several pregnant women were shot as they sat together in front of one house. The rest of the hamlet had fled.	A. Xuyen Phuoc assistant village chief and a number of other villagers at Xuyen Phuoc refugee camp.
Hamlet 4	Xuyen Phuoc	8/2/*	86 people, including old men, women and children, were killed.	B. A resident of Xuyen Tho gathered details of these reports from other villagers. *Year uncertain, probably 1969.
Hamlet 5	Xuyen Phuoc	22/3/*	64 people, mostly women and children, were found hiding in bunkers and killed.	
Hamlet 4	Xuyen Phuoc	20/6/*	47 people were killed with explosives in a single large bunker.	
Le Son, Son Vien	Xuyen Tho	4th day of Tet 1969 (21/2/69)	34 people who had fled their village because of Korean soldiers were returning home to make New Year's offerings and were killed.	A. A large number of villagers from Xuyen Tho refugee camp, many of whom had buried bodies of relatives killed by Korean troops on operation.
Le Son & Thuan An	Xuyen Tho	6/4/69	74 people were rounded up, led to a sand dune, shot, their bodies pushed into a bomb crater.	



100-100



**AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE**  
National Office: 160 N. 15th Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19102